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This thesis examines the Georges River Clam Management Program, a 
multi-town interlocal harvesting and management plan in mid-coast Maine. It 
discusses relevant economic and communal action theory, and examines their 
application to the development of the program. 
Chapter 1 reviews the purposes and methods of the study. 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant clam biology necessary to understand the 
principles of soft-shell clam management. 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide the history and background of clam harvesting 
and management in Maine. 
Chapter 5 discusses the Georges River Program, including the factors that 
led to its development and the details of its organization and scope. 
Chapter 6 provides a review of the pertinent literature pertaining to 
fisheries economics, rational choice theory, externality theory, collective action 
theory and co-management. 
Chapter 7 provides state of Maine landings data obtained from the 
Department of Marine Resources. It compares catch per unit of effort figures 
between the Georges River estuary and the state as a whole both prior to and post 
management. 
Chapter 8 discusses how the theories and facts discussed in the previous 
chapters are relevant to the Georges River Program. In particular, it examines the 
relevance of co-management theory versus economic theory. It also discusses the 
program's potential for long-term success, and what lessons can be learned from 
the program and applied to fisheries management theory in general. 
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The state of Maine allows municipalities to develop soft-shell clan1 management 
programs giving preferential harvesting rights to locals. This allows towns to develop 
management that excludes people from the resource and potentially increases yields for 
those harvesters with access to the flats. 
In 1996, five towns along the Georges River Estuary in mid-coast Maine entered 
into a multi-town cooperative soft-shell clam harvesting agreement and management 
program. A two-tiered management regime was established, with a shellfish committee 
comprised of local harvesters, and a joint board with selectmen from each of the towns. 
Harvesters must perform conservation activities each year to be eligible for a license. 
Although surveys are not regularly completed, anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
management program has been a success by establishing higher than average CPUE and 
maintaining rather than depleting the resource. 
The Georges River program is an example of co-management, which has gained 
popularity in recent years as an alternative to traditional top-down control. Several co- 
management authors have developed theories examining the factors that facilitate the 
development of successful self-governance and co-management. This study examines 
these theories, and discusses their application to the Georges River program. In 
particular, the theories of Schlager and Ostrom (1 993) are examined, and their concept of 
property rights in fisheries is discussed. 
This study also uses common property and co-management theory to discuss the 
possible future of the Georges River program, and the lessons it has to offer fisheries 




Mya arenaria, known in Maine as the soft-shell clam or steamer clam, occurs 
naturally along the coasts of North America, Europe, and Asia. In the United States, it is 
most common from Maine to Maryland. 
Within this range, soft-shell clams live within tidal flats, in water of approximate 
ocean salinity (30-32 parts per thousand), although they are able to survive great ranges 
in salinity for short periods of time. They are bottom-dwelling (benthic) bivalves that 
live within the bottom sediment. 
Feeding and Anatomy 
The soft-shell clam feeds by projecting a siphon into the water column, where it 
filters microscopic particles (primarily phytoplankton, but also zooplankton, bacteria, and 
detritus) out of suspension. Cilia on the gills generate a feeding current, carrying 
seawater through the inhalant siphon and inhalant chambers. As the water passes by, 
branched cilia strain out suspended particles as small as 5 microns. The particles are then 
swept into food grooves and carried toward the mouth by cilia. Food is ground up and 
partially digested by the action of the crystalline style (a clear, flexible rod within the 
stomach). Further digestion takes place in the digestive gland, and feces are released at 
the anus and carried out the exhalant siphon. 
Clams are capable of pumping and filtering a large amount of seawater. Clams 
approximately 25-32 mm long can filter as much as 2.5 liters per hour in the summer 
(Ellis, 1998). Their ability to filter and digest food varies throughout the year, with the 
greatest rate of food digestion occurring in summer. 
The clam's two elongated valves are joined at the hinge by an interlocking 
projection and ligament. A live clam regulates the opening and closing of the shell with 
two adductor muscles. When these muscles are relaxed, the shell is forced open by an 
elastic pad beneath the hinge. The death of the clam will produce the same result. 
Each shell is made up of two calcium carbonate layers and a protective covering. 
This covering varies in thickness, color, and shape according to the growth rate and the 
sediment type in which the clam lives. With each period of growth, new material is 
added to the shell. In winter, the growth period ends, and a thickening of the shell edge 
occurs. This process results in observable growth lines on the shell. The width of these 
lines can be used to approximate growth rate, but is not an exact indicator. 
Spawning and Setting 
Clams are male or female, and spawning is accomplished by releasing sperm or eggs into 
the water column. A 6.25 cm (2 inch) female may spawn about 3 million eggs a year, 
and a male of the same size produces billions of sperm (Dow and Wallace, 1961). 
Fertilized eggs develop into veliger larvae (named for the velum, which is the 
swimming appendage). The veliger larva stays suspended in the water for three to six 
weeks. During this time its movement is controlled primarily by tidal currents and winds. 
During its free-swimming period, the larva develops a foot (becoming a 
pediveliger) with which it is able to crawl about after settling out of the water column. It 
also develops a shell and most of the organs characteristic of the adult. Even as a 
pediveliger, the larva is able to swim if the substrate type encountered is unsuitable. 
Once settled, a clam probes the new substrate with its foot. If the bottom is hard and 
impenetrable, the clam will retract its foot and swim away. This "swim and crawl" stage 
allows the pediveliger to delay settlement for up to a week while choosing its eventual 
home. During this time it is subject to unfavorable winds, storms, and changes to 
salinity, temperature, currents, and food availability. It is also subject to predation. 
Because of these factors, and the fact that eventual placement of the clam is largely 
dependent on currents and winds, only a small percentage of pediveliger larvae survive to 
settle out within reach of a suitable substrate. 
Eventually, the swimming organ degenerates completely, and the clam larva 
attaches itself to some object (sand grains, seaweed, rocks, etc.) by means of a byssal 
thread. The thread is similar to that found in the adult mussel, and the clam can now 
move over the flats, swinging by the byssus and detaching at any time to crawl along the 
bottom with its foot. When it reaches a suitable location, the young clam burrows into 
the sediment. If it is dislodged or washed out, it can dig in again. It can also dig its way 
out of the sediment if conditions become unfavorable and migrate short distances by 
crawling with its foot. However, the clam is permanently established in its burrow before 
it is an inch long (Dow and Wallace, 1957). The clam retains its ability to dig into 
sediment through adulthood, although this ability diminishes with increasing size. The 
ability to move about while still young can make it difficult to predict future 
concentrations of clams in a flat. Samples taken may show high concentrations of spat, 
while later testing may show a total absence of clams (Stubbs, 1982). 
Current patterns and other environmental factors can be very important in larval 
settlement. Certain flats, or specific areas within them, may exhibit a higher affinity for 
settlement than others. In Casco Bay, for instance, soft-shell clams generally settle more 
heavily in northeastern sections of coves and in south-facing flats (Ellis, 1998). 
Clam recruitment can vary greatly from year to year, due to nunlerous factors 
including low spawning effort, poor current patterns, or high predation. When conditions 
are favorable and good spawning success leads to numerous larvae that are able to settle 
out successfully, a dominant year class develops. This dominant year class may be able 
to sustain the fishery for several seasons despite subsequent years of unsuccessful 
settlement if managed properly (Ellis, 1998). 
Clam Growth 
Clam growth depends on a number of factors such as water temperature, food 
availability, degree of crowding, and time of submergence. If all other factors are equal, 
differences in growth rate have been shown to depend on water temperature alone (Dow 
and Wallace, 1961). Warm water tends to favor rapid growth, and the greatest 
percentage of annual shell growth occurs between early June to mid-August. Only 1 % of 
yearly shell growth occurs from October to the following spring (Ellis, 1998). Although 
warm waters enhance growth rate, excessively high temperatures can be detrimental 
(Dow and Wallace, 196 1). 
Clams found lower in the intertidal zone grow at a greater rate than those higher 
in the zone, presumably due to the length of time they are submerged and able to feed. In 
southern portions of Maine, clams may reach two inches in one-and-a-half growing 
seasons near the low water mark. It may take eight to ten years or more for clams located 
higher in the intertidal zone to reach this size. 
Type of sediment can also affect growth rate. The hydrographic and geological 
conditions that create a sandy bottom are also favorable to clam growth. Sand bottom 
occurs in well-washed areas with rapid water movement. It provides good drainage, 
water percolation, and water exchange. The rapid growth of clams in these favorable 
conditions results in a thin white shell, which brings a higher price in the steamer market. 
Although the quickly-moving water that creates a sandy bottom creates favorable 
growing conditions, it also has its drawbacks. Quick tidal currents can make it difficult 
for larva to establish a bottom attachment, and can also erode bottom sediments (Dow 
and Wallace, 1961). 
Violent storms can also cause erosion, especially when moving in the same 
direction as the tidal current. Occasionally, enough sediment is displaced to expose the 
shellfish beneath. If this occurs during cold winter months, a large percentage of the 
clam population will die (Dow and Wallace, 1961). During cold weather, clams exposed 
on the surface make very little effort to dig themselves in again. Repeated thawing and 
freezing on the surface of the flats results in their death because the pallial (mantle) 
muscle of the clam breaks away from the shell. Although the clam may still be alive, it is 
unable to burrow into the flats. 
The converse situation can also result in clam death, when storms move sandbars 
shoreward, burying and smothering clams in the tidal flats. Erosion occurring above 
mean high water can also have serious consequences. A thin layer of clay, deposited on 
the surface of the flats, can kill the clams. Commercial diggers refer to these areas as 
"dead flats" (Dow and Wallace, 1961). Upstream or adjacent dredging, land movement, 
or high runoff can cause mass mortalities. Since clams must keep their siphons clear of 
sediment in order to feed and breathe, increased sediment loads from human activity can 
result in suffocation or starvation. 
Predators 
Soft-shell clams are a food source for many organisms other than humans, and the 
numbers and types of predators change with the size of the clam. Planktonic clam 
veligers experience high predation from zooplankton, larval fish, and planktivorous adult 
fish. Upon reaching approximately lmm, they are subject to predation by worms, 
amphipods, snails, and crabs. As the clams grow, their list of predators decreases. 
The northern moon snail (Euspira heros) and the banded moon snail (Euspira 
triserata) both prey on Maine's soft-shell clam population. Snails attack clams that are 
similar to their own size by drilling a hole in the shell with their radula and secreting 
digestive enzymes to kill the clam. They then insert their mouth-like proboscis through 
the hole and consume the clam. According to a study in Whiting Bay near the town of 
Edmunds, moon snails can consume up to 60 percent of clams less than 20mm during a 
summer (Ellis, 1998). Moon snail predation is particularly important in eastern Maine. 
Humans are an obvious predator to the soft-shell clam, and even those clams left 
behind can perish due to harvesting activity. Shell breakage and burial occur each time a 
flat is turned over for harvest. Commercial digging operations leave undersized clams 
buried at depths of 1 to 9 inches (Dow and Wallace, 1961). The deeper the clam is 
buried, the poorer their chances are for survival. Each time a flat is dug, about half of the 
small clams are buried too deep to survive. Survival is proportional to clam size (larger 
clams are more likely to survive re-burial), and better in winter than in summer (Glude, 
1954). 
The Green Crab Problem 
Green crabs (Carcinus maenas) can be an extremely significant predator for soft- 
shell clams. Although not native to the Americas, green crabs were introduced to the 
Atlantic coast from Europe in the late 1800s, and established themselves on the coast of 
Maine in the early 1900s. They are particularly important predators on smaller clams. 
Smaller clams have thinner shells and are burrowed less deeply in the sediment. Clams 
less than 12mm in length can usually be eaten whole, while larger ones are chipped apart 
and the meats picked out. Clams over 6Omm become resistant to green crab predation, 
due partly to a heavier and thicker shell, as well as their ability to burrow more deeply 
into the sediment (Ellis, 1998). 
Green crabs seem to suffer from colder than average winters, and their predatory 
effect on clams has not been constant throughout the past decades. Green crab predation 
was particularly great in eastern Maine in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, the 
Washington County softshell clam harvest fell from 294,000 bushels in 1950 to 32,000 
bushels in 1962. Green crab predation is thought to be a major reason for this decline 
(Ellis, 1998). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that green crab levels are on the rise, and a "green 
crab task force" has been formed by the Maine Sofishell Clam Advisory Council to 
address the problems they pose to Maine's clam harvest. Various attempts have been 
made to reduce their impact on clams, with varying success. Poison bait, trapping, and 
fencing have all worked to varying degrees on a local basis, although none are as 
effective as natural temperature cycles. Currently there are no state-wide measures in 
effect to control the green crab population. A fencing program administered by the 
Department of Marine Resources has currently been inactive for more than 15 years 
(Ellis, 1998). 
Green crabs are harvested for profit in Maine, although only on a very small scale. 
Researchers at the University of Maine at Machias are currently working to develop this 
fishery, and the green crab task force is working to develop a program to sell licenses for 
their harvest. Currently, only those holding a lobsterlcrab license are able to harvest 
green crabs. A separate license would allow more people to harvest the crabs, and fees 
for the licenses could be used to further address the green crab problem (author's notes 
from Clam Symposium at the Maine Fishermen's Forum, March 2002). 
Chapter 3 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF CLAMMING 
The soft-shell clam has long been an important resource for coastal New 
Englanders. The clam resource has played a significant role in the social and economic 
history of the area, and its importance dates back to well before the amval of the first 
European settlers. Fragments of shells found on the Glidden Fann in Newcastle show a 
carbon 14 age of some 1700 years (Dow and Wallace, 196 I). Their prevalence in kitchen 
middens (also known as "clam heaps") attests to their historic importance to Native 
Americans. 
Although clams were an important food source for Native Americans, European 
settlers did not take to them with equal fondness. Although they made use of the 
resource, they initially did so only in times of dire need. Clams were eaten only as a last 
resort to prevent starvation. Period writings convey the low esteem in which clams were 
held. In one document, Elder Brewster of the Plymouth Colony wrote that in the winter 
of 1620-21 he often had "only clams to eatV(Dow and Wallace, 1961). 
In years of poor harvest, people often traveled great distances to dig clams. This 
usually took place in late winter and spring. when the goods they had stored from the 
harvest were gone, and no alternative food source was available. In his Journal of Maine 
History, Sprague wrote "In 1781 food was scarce with many at the Kennebec.. ., many 
even twenty miles inland sought the clam banks."( Dow and Wallace, 1961) 
The clam resource was indeed available to all who wanted it. Laws governing 
Maine's soft-shell clam resource, which are derived from English Common Law, allow 
all citizens to make use of lands below the high-tide line for fishing, fowling, or 
navigation. Clams were thought of as common property and a last-resort food. The low 
esteem in which clams were held would certainly have played a role in their initial lack of 
commercial development. The fact that clams were available to all who wanted them, 
and the apparent lin~itlessness of the resource probably contributed also to the lack of 
management of the resource. 
Soft-shell clams were used for food and bait since colonial times, and were dug 
without regulation. The supply seemed so limitless, and the demand so moderate, that a 
shortage of the resource seemed implausible. As the economies of the New England 
states grew, the in~portance of the soft-shell clam as a food resource decreased as a wider 
variety of foods became more accessible and affordable. However, its importance was 
boosted in the early 1800s with the increase of hand line trawl fisheries. Soft-shell clams 
opened easily. stayed on the hook well, and provided a plump and enticing bait. Great 
numbers of clams were salted in barrels for use by Grand Bank fishennen. They were 
dug and barreled from October through March, a process that provided welcome winter 
employment to many coastal Mainers. 
The salt-bait industry declined after 1875 as Bank fishennen began using fresh 
bait. However, a consumer market had developed both for steamed clams in the shell and 
canned clams. By the late 1 800's, clams were being canned in significant quantities, and 
canned clam production in Maine amounted to roughly 60,000 cases per year (Dow and 
Wallace, 1961). From 1900 to 1940, the canneries took the major portion of all clams 
produced in Maine. Canning was confined to the winter months when there was little 
competition from other activities, so the canning season continued the tradition of winter 
clam digging. As a conservation measure, the state established a canning season in 1901, 
which limited the harvest of soft-shell clams from September 15 to June 1. Parallel 
legislation prohibited the transporting of clams beyond state limits unless the clams had 
been canned, packed, or barreled during the legislated winter season. This season 
allowed for maximum utilization of canning factories, with soft-shell canning occurring 
in winter and spring, and sardines in the summer. However, at the same time that the 
canned clam market was booming, soft-shell clambakes were becoming increasingly 
popular. Those engaged in the steamer clam trade were eventually able to obtain waivers 
of the seasonal digging laws during the summer to allow for steamed clam consumption 
within the State. 
Although fresh clams were popular in the state of Maine during the summer 
months, the restrictions on their transport limited the development of a fresh market 
outside the state. In the early part of the twentieth century, the vast majority of Maine 
soft-shell clams were destined for the canned market. However several factors would 
contribute to a greater importance for the fresh clam market, which would grow to 
surpass that of canned clams. 
Maryland's soft-shell clam and surf clam industries developed in the early 
twentieth century, and these less-expensive clams quickly replaced Maine clams as the 
favorite of the canning industry. Also, just prior to World War 11, a large restaurant chain 
introduced fried clams made from fresh-shucked clam meats. Their new specialty, 
cooked in the newly invented fryolator, became very popular. This innovation is credited 
with the increase in demand for shucked clams from Maine as well as from other growing 
areas in New England and Canada (Dow and Wallace, 1961). 
With the increased demand for clam meats and steamers, the fresh clam industry 
would fight to repeal the summer digging restrictions altogether. They argued that winter 
digging led to the freezing death of the clams unearthed from their protective cover of 
mud on the flats. The canning industry would counter that summer heat would kill 
exposed clams. Eventually, summer digging restrictions were lifted on a county-by- 
county basis beginning in 1937. Interestingly, a perceived economic dependence on 
winter canning prevented the ban from being lifted in Maine's four northeastern counties 
until much later. 
During World War 11, many clam diggers went off to fight, and clam stocks 
increased in number. At the close of the war, discharged military personnel began 
looking for work, and many went to the flats. For many, clam digging was merely 
interim employment while they looked for other more permanent work. This perception 
of clam digging being an interim employment while the digger "looks for something 
better" persisted throughout much of the last century. Clams have been Maine's second 
or third most valuable fishery in over half of the last fifty years, and have always been an 
important supplemental income for many of Maine's coastal families. However, respect 
for the profession of clam digging has not always been on par with the resource's 
monetary value. 
Unlike many other fisheries, a person wishing to dig clams professionally has 
very low start-up costs. The cost of the license itself, which rarely exceeds $200, is 
undoubtedly the greatest necessary expense (although many diggers use boats to travel 
between flats, a boat is not always a necessary component of clam harvesting). In 1957 
the Maine Legislature passed a law that limited clam digging to hand harvesting only. 
This ensured that clam digging would remain an easily accessible fishery. Although 
fishermen in other industries are often unable to compete effectively without costly 
equipment, no such equipment is required to dig clams or to process them for sale. The 
traditional tool of the trade is a multi-tined hoe used to turn over the sediments in which 
the clams live. In some areas of the state, primarily Downeast, they are "pulled" from 
soft sediments without the aid of a hoe or other implement. 
Prior to World War 11, clammers measured their daily production in barrels, equal 
to roughly three bushels. A harvest of two or three barrels per tide per clam digger was 
common. At that time, clams were plentiful and were relatively low in value compared 
to other Maine seafood. Fewer than 1500 licensed diggers worked professionally in 
Maine, and each could expect to harvest more than 1000 bushels per year. In contrast, 
full-time clammers today, which number roughly 2030 (personal communication with 
Hal Winters), can expect to harvest approximately 300 to 500 bushels of clams per year. 
Following World War 11, both the number of diggers and the annual landings 
increased dramatically. The increased landings were due to the increase in diggers, the 
respite the flats received during the war that allowed the clams to accumulate, and an 
increase in market demand for protein foods (Dow and Wallace, 1961). 
Landings began to decline in 1950, and reached record lows in the mid-1 950s. 
The drop in landings is generally attributed to increased harvesting after the war, greater 
predation from green crabs, and more closures due to increased water quality 
assessments. A slow recovery followed, and the prices paid for soft-shell clams grew 
dramatically between 1973 and 1992. 
Both landings and the number of harvesters again declined rapidly beginning in 
1985. By 1996, the harvest was the third lowest since 1941, with just more than 1.5 
million pounds collected by 1700 harvesters. This represents a 75 percent decrease from 
the production highs of the 1970s and early 80s. The dramatic decrease in wild clam 
populations has resulted in annual declines of nearly $3.5 million to Maine clam diggers, 
despite the continued increase in price paid per bushel. Although the reasons for these 
historic low landings levels are not entirely understood, it is generally accepted that 
environmental factors as well as over-exploitation have played a role. Currently, roughly 
20 percent of Maine's commercially licensed clammers work full-time in the industry 
(Ellis, 1998, confirmed for 2001 by personal communication with Hal Winters). 
It is not uncommon for full-time clam harvesters to display animosity toward 
"part-timers". Full-time fishermen consider themselves dependent on clam digging, and 
resent the part-timers, who take away "their" clams merely to supplement their incomes. 
This animosity can become an important factor when full-timers and part-timers come 
face-to-face on shellfish management committees. 
When a town decides to develop an ordinance, it must decide whether it wants to 
support commercial harvesting, recreational harvesting, or both. Some towns prohibit 
any commercial digging, which leaves the resource available on an exclusively 
recreational basis to residents. There is a long-standing tradition in Maine of locals being 
able to dig a "mess" of clams for themselves and their families. Recreational harvesting is 
usually limited to one peck per day in order to prevent the commercial sale of 
recreationally-dug clams. Recreational diggers are often avid supporters of clam 
management plans. 
Despite the recent decline in clam stocks, or perhaps even because of it, many 
towns have begun to change the way they manage their flats. As mentioned above, the 
tradition in Maine has always been to allow open access to clam flats. There has also 
been a strongly town-based, territorial tradition that allows for preferential harvesting of 
clam flats by town residents. In the past, locals discouraged non-residents from working 
the flats they looked at as "their own". They often did so without the legal sanction of a 
town law or municipal ordinance. Without a town ordinance, a conmunity's clams are 
available to anyone holding a state commercial harvesting license. Today, the main goal 
of many community management plans is to preserve the resource for local residents. 
The following chapter will discuss the history of Maine's clam management in 
detail. 
Chapter 4 
CLAM CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Conservation Measures 
The first clam conservation efforts in Maine were a direct result of the seasonal 
commercialization of the resource (Dow and Wallace, 1949). Clams were first dug 
commercially for use in the salt bait and canning industries, both of which were winter 
activities. With no summer market for their product, clam diggers did not operate from 
April to Qctober. This resulted in a voluntary closed season that would set the precedent 
for future laws. 
The first law restricting the taking of clams was passed in 1890. It prohibited the 
digging of some flats in June, July, August, and part of September (Dow and Wallace, 
1949). It remained in place until 1937, when it was repealed in three southwestern 
counties with growing markets for fresh clams. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, in the early 1900's the Maine legislature 
prohibited out of state shipment of clams during the summer months. The ban was 
accepted at first without protest. However, in the 1940's the market for fresh shucked 
and whole clams increased considerably. Maine harvesters and processors convinced the 
legislature to lift the ban on a county-by-county basis beginning with Lincoln County in 
194 1. By 1949, summer digging and out-of-state transport of clams were permitted in all 
Maine counties. 
When harvesters began working year-round, it became apparent that some sort of 
seasonal closure should be established. Divided interest groups argued for different 
seasonal closures. Those involved in the canning industry claimed that summer heat 
killed unearthed clams. They also claimed that the closed season should correspond with 
the spawning period, which takes place in the spring. Those involved in the fresh market 
claimed that winter freezing was detrimental to clams, and argued for a winter closure. 
State-wide consensus was never achieved. Instead, the state established 
minimum conservation requirements and allowed towns the option of developing more 
specific management programs. A two-inch minimum size was established in 1935, and 
state commercial harvesting licenses were first required in 1947. The first closure of flats 
due to pollution occurred in the 1930s in southern Maine (Ellis, 1998). To this day, the 
state retains the responsibility of monitoring clam flats for potential health risks. 
b 
State licensing was initiated in 1947 to satisfy federal public health requirements 
for interstate trade in shellfish and to gather more reliable statistics on the fishery. The 
state requires commercial clam harvesters to purchase a state shellfish license and to 
harvest only clams over two inches in length (with a 10 percent tolerance of undersized 
clams per bushel). The Department of Marine Resources also sets the standards that local 
ordinances must meet in order to be approved. State Marine Patrol officers of the DMR 
enforce the two-inch minimum law and prevent the harvesting of clams from closed 
areas. They do not enforce local ordinances. The DMR tests shellfish species for the 
presence of paralytic shellfish poisoning (known as "red tide"). DMR area biologists and 
local water quality monitoring groups test water quality and identify pollution sources. 
Based on the results of these tests, the DMR classifies shellfish-growing areas as open to 
harvesting, open to restricted harvesting, or closed to all harvesting. Flats can also be 
closed on a seasonal basis, as when spring runoff or increased (human) summer 
populations result in an increase of water-born bacteria. 
DMR uses standards created by the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference 
under the National Shellfish Sanitation Program. In the late 1980s, these standards were 
changed (personal communication with Hal Winters). Earlier in the century, flats 
remained open unless testing showed a need to close them. The new ISSC standards 
shifted the "burden of proof '. A flat would remain closed until it was tested as safe. The 
criteria for keeping areas open became more stringent, and the required testing frequency 
was increased. These changes occurred at the same time that Maine state budget cuts 
decreased funding to the DMR. In 1988, the ISSC released a report that listed Maine as 
one of a number of states not in compliance with the new standards. In order to continue 
interstate trade in shellfish, these states had to close areas that were not properly 
classified. As a result, Maine DMR closed roughly 30% of its productive flats, which 
amounted to approxinlately 83,000 acres (Hal Winters, personal communication). Even if 
water quality were dramatically improved, a flat would sometimes remain closed simply 
because DMR lacked the resources to perform the necessary tests. 
A History of Local-Level Management 
There is a long tradition of local shellfish management in Maine. In 182 1, the 
Maine Legislature granted coastal municipalities the authority to issue permits for taking 
shellfish and imposed a standard penalty for the violation of the permit conditions (Ellis, 
1998). The State Legislature passed "Private and Special Laws" for particular towns 
from 1895 until 1963. In 1963, they passed legislation that permitted towns to establish 
local ordinances regulating the harvest of soft-shell clams under DMR supervision. 
This legislation is unique in Maine's fisheries management. Although town plans 
must be approved by the DMR, municipalities have a great deal of freedom in designing 
their own programs. This freedom is due at least in part to the strongly town-based 
territorial attitudes toward the resource. It is also due to the characteristics of the clam 
itself. Unlike many other managed marine fisheries, clams are sedentary. One town's 
management is less likely to affect the resources of a neighboring community. Since 
adult clams within town boundaries remain there until harvested, local control is more 
feasible than in other fisheries. 
Individual towns have the option of enacting their own ordinance for the 
protection of their resource, or relying solely on the limited state regulations. In 1985, 
Ralph Townsend concluded that managed flats typically have a 15 percent higher catch 
per unit effort than unmanaged flats. In 2001, 53 coastal communities had ordinances for 
the protection of their soft-shell clams. 
Once a town has enacted a management plan, it is responsible for the enforcement 
of its ordinance. Town ordinances usually require a town license, with residents paying 
substantially less than out-of -towers. The state requires that towns make at least 10% 
of commercial licenses available to non-residents, and the fee for these licenses may not 
exceed twice the resident fee (or one and a half times the resident fee if the resident 
license is $200 or more). Many towns require the fulfillment of "conservation hours" in 
order to be eligible for a commercial license. These hours can be fulfilled by 
participating in shoreline clean-ups, reseeding events, and other events intended to 
enhance the resource. The towns also have the ability to manage their resource as they 
see fit subject to the approval of the DMR. Area biologists are available to assist 
municipalities with their management plans. 
Towns can manage their softshell clam resource in several ways. The primary 
reason most local programs exist is to allow preferential harvesting to local residents. 
Prior to 1963, most local management programs limited commercial digging to town 
residents or land owners. Legal challenges within Maine and elsewhere argued that these 
restrictions violate federal constitutional protections (Clime and Townsend, 1993). The 
DMR then discouraged outright bans on non-resident licenses. Today, state statute 
requires all towns that issue commercial licenses to make at least 10 percent of the 
licenses available to non-residents. They also encourage towns to adopt more 
comprehensive management strategies that include flat closures and rotations, stock 
assessment, and reseeding. 
The DMR published a handbook for community management in 1999. The book 
is intended to clarify management program options and town responsibilities. In the 
book, they specify the following approved activities and tools towns can use to manage 
their clam resources: 
Clam Management Activities 
Setting the number and types of licenses - towns can restrict entry into the fishery 
by limiting the number of licenses available. A number of towns rely solely on 
this activity to manage their resource. 
Establishing conservation areas - This is done for a number of reasons: to protect 
areas that have been seeded from harvest activity until the seed has reached legal 
size, to set aside an area that doesn't freeze up in the winter for digging; and to 
rotate with other conservation areas to even out harvest effort, particularly for 
areas prone to overharvesting. 
Restricting the amounl, lime, or season ofharvest - Most towns do not limit the 
amount of clams a commercial harvester can take, but do limit recreational 
digging to one peck to discourage the selling of recreationally harvested clams. 
Time restrictions usually involve night digging, which is prohibited by some 
towns. Harvest seasons are generally imposed due to water quality 
considerations, although some towns also restrict digging to weekends and 
holidays. 
Seeding wilh halchery stock - A number of towns have worked with both public 
and private hatcheries in an effort to augment natural recruitment through seeding. 
Several studies are underway or planned to determine the best procedures for 
seeding flats with hatchery stock. 
Reseedingfiom closed or high density areas - For towns with areas containing a 
high density of clams, reseeding or transplanting juvenile (sub legal) clams is the 
preferred method to enhance natural recruitment. Several Maine towns reseed 
each year. 
Protection fiom predation with-fences, traps or nets -Fencing used to be 
common, but has fallen out of favor due to its cost and labor. Nets placed over 
the sediment are often used in seedinglreseeding projects, as the seed clams are 
particularly vulnerable to predation. 
Enhancing spatfull with brush, .fences or nets - The placement of partial barriers 
(such as pieces of brush, fences or nets) on the flat works to slow currents and 
form eddies which encourage spat to drop out of the water. This activity is only 
effective when spat are present in the water column. 
Clam Management Tools 
Clamflat surveys - Surveys were once required by the DMR, but many towns did 
not have the ability to comply with the requirement. Surveys consist of counting 
and measuring clams taken from two square-foot plots. The plots are situated 
every 100 feet along a series of transects forming a grid over the flat. They 
provide information on size distribution, average density and standing crop. 
Surveys are the only way to make a direct assessment of standing crop. 
Production data - The two main sources for landings information are shellfish 
dealer reports and warden reports. Towns with only recreational harvesting will 
have only warden reports available. Shellfish dealers are required to submit 
monthly reports to the Department of Marine Resources (DMR), including 
information on where clams were harvested and by how many harvesters. These 
data can vary in accuracy, as harvesters are sometimes reluctant to reveal the 
exact location of their harvest, and are not always diligent in their reports. 
Landings data from 1997 onward are available at the DMR. Landings data by 
town prior to 1997 are not always reliable, as they are available only through 
original dealer reports that are difficult or impossible to obtain. 
Committee meetings - The most successful management programs have regularly 
scheduled monthly meetings. Towns that encourage harvester participation in the 
meetings gain a valuable source of infornlation and feedback. Harvesters are also 
more likely to abide by the rules if they feel they had a hand in their creation. 
Conservation Credits - Conservation credits are often given to diggers in 
exchange for labor in reseedings, surveys, committee membership, or clean-up 
efforts. The credits are often required to obtain a license for the following year. 
Enforcement - Enforcement is a vital component of any management program. A 
shellfish warden must be present to monitor and patrol flats in all towns with 
ordinances. State wardens will patrol flats to enforce the two-inch minimum law 
and closures, but all towns with ordinances must hire a shellfish warden to 
enforce local regulations. 
As mentioned above, the most successful town programs are supported by 
community volunteers. These groups consist of selectmen, harvesters, or members of the 
general public who are willing to volunteer their time and efforts in the interest of clam 
management. Their roles vary from town to town. Possible activities include 
conservation projects such as reseeding and shoreline clean-ups, organizing fundraising 
activities, writing newsletters, or distributing infonnation to licensed diggers. In some 
communities, these groups may take part in management itself, either as advisors or as 
the actual decision makers. The success of any program depends in large part on the 
dedication of these community volunteers. Often, one individual or several individuals 
will "cany" a town program. If this individual decides to limit his or her involvement, 
the program will often suffer. Volunteers regularly complain of "burnout" from many 
hours of unpaid work. Their dedication levels vary, and program success and community 
responsiveness often fluctuate from year to year. 
Although some communities hold fundraising events, many town management 
efforts are funded exclusively by license sales. When landings decline, fewer harvesters 
purchase licenses. As a result, money for management and enhancement activities often 
decrease at the time when they are most needed. Some programs, such as the Georges 
River Program, receive money from local taxpayers. Although this supplies financial 
assistance, it can also be problen~atic. Harvesters can resent feeling obliged to "answer" 
to town management and justify their actions and expenditures to local taxpayers. 
Depuration Dig- 
The DMR classifies areas as either open to harvesting, closed, or open to 
restricted digging (also known as open conditionally). If a flat is open conditionally, the 
clams there can be harvested only by depuration companies. They are then taken back to 
a plant where they are treated with ultraviolet light and filtered seawater to kill any 
hannful bacteria that may be present. They can then be sold safely to consumers. 
Areas are often open to depuration digging after having been closed for some 
time. The lack of digging during closure will often result in a "goldmine" of clams to be 
harvested by the depuration companies. These flats also produce above-average yields 
per digger simply because they are closed to all other digging (Townsend, 1986). Higher 
yields per digger are offset by lower prices paid to diggers per pound. Lower prices are 
necessary to offset processing costs. Local harvesters often express resentment that 
people from outside the area are able to harvest what should be their clams. Depuration 
companies are required by law to hire local diggers preferentially. However, local 
diggers sometimes argue that this does not take place. They complain that they receive 
no benefits from the operation, while the depuration companies are able to go in and 
"pillage" their flats. This has been an especially vexing issue in the Georges River area, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. Currently there is only one depuration plant 
operating in the state of Maine. 
Cooperative Efforts 
In 1997, the Maine Soft-shell Clam Advisory Council was formed as a 
collaborative effort between clam harvesters, state agencies, and non-profit organizations. 
The Council is intended to provide a forum where issues and policies relating to soft-shell 
clam management can be discussed among all stakeholders. The objectives of the 
MSSCAC are to collect infom~ation at the local level, recommend policy, and redistribute 
infom~ation back to the local level (Ellis, 1998). 
It has proven difficult to get stakeholders from all parts of the coast together for 
regular meetings. As a result, the MSSCAC created three regional (downeast, mid-coast 
and Casco Bay) councils to discuss local issues of clam management. These issues could 
be dealt with at the area council, or brought to the state-wide meetings if necessary. The 
councils of the mid coast and downeast never took hold, and neither council exists today. 
The Casco Bay Regional Clam Management Council currently meets once each month. 
Although towns manage their soft-shell clams individually, many communities 
are beginning to realize that cooperation with neighboring communities can benefit the 
resource. Although clams are perceived as a sedentary species, they are mobile in their 
early developmental stages (see clam biology section), and cooperative management is 
seen as one way to encourage a "good set" for a community. It is also more efficient to 
manage flats on their entirety rather than on the basis of town boundaries, both in tenns 
of the effectiveness of management and the costs of enforcement. The single greatest 
management expense for most towns is the cost of the shellfish warden's salary. It makes 
sense for neighboring towns to combine numerous part-time positions into one full-time 
position and split the cost. 
In January of 1996, the towns around the Georges River Clam Project introduced 
an act to the Maine legislature that would allow towns to form regional shellfish 
commissions. Prior to this, local management was only recognized at the town level. 
This legislation allowed towns to cooperate on their shellfish management without 
having to form individual town shellfish committees as had been required by existing 
laws. The Georges River Program is currently the only example of a multi-town 
ordinance in the state of Maine. 
Numerous towns have attempted to cooperate on their management plans, in 
varying degrees of formality. The towns of Arrowsic, West Bath, Phippsburg, 
Georgetown and Woolwich have independent ordinances, but share one warden. Other 
towns have tried to arrange more formal cooperation, such as those listed below. 
Cobscook Bay Clam Restoration Project 
Between 1995 and 2001, Lubec, Trescott, Whiting, Edmunds, Dennysville, 
Pembroke, Perry, Pleasant Point, and Eastport managed their clam resources jointly. The 
Cobscook Bay Clam Restoration Project facilitates and coordinates the management, 
with the goals of improving the health of the bay, increasing productivity of the flats, 
creating a regional approach to clam management, and increasing access to education in 
resource management. Although the towns cooperated on area management, they did not 
have a joint ordinance to cover the entire area. Each town was responsible for the 
management of its own resource, and chose how they would cooperate with the other 
towns to enhance these efforts. 
Damariscotta River Regional - Management Program 
Boothbay, Boothbay Harbor, Damariscota, Edgecomb and Newcastle share their 
clam resources through reciprocal harvesting agreements included in each town's 
management ordinance. This arrangement began in 1991, when it was adopted 
independently by each town. 
Clam management is administered solely by the lead town, which alternates 
between the five communities. Each town determines and issues its own number of 
commercial licenses. A commercial license from any of the five towns allows its holder 
to dig in any of the communities' flats. 
Georges River Clam Project 
The Georges River Program is unique in the state in that five towns work together 
under a single interlocal agreement and ordinance. Management is carried out by two 
groups - the Joint Board of Selectmen and the Shellfish Committee. Chapter 4 describes 
the program in detail. 
The cooperation between towns, fishermen, and management officials that takes 
place in these cooperative plans helps to overcome one of the greatest problems 
confronting fisheries management. That problem is an inherent mistrust between people 
who harvest a resource, the people who study it, and the people who regulate it. When 
researchers attempt to gain information from fishermen, they are confronted with the 
mistrust. A harvester is unlikely to give accurate reports of his landings if he believes the 
information may come back to haunt him. This negative impact could be in the form of 
higher taxes if the IRS realizes his true landings, other fishennen discovering the good 
areas he's found to dig, or increased regulations if someone believes he is harvesting 
either too many or too few clams. 
A cooperative approach to management is essential if this mistrust is to be 
overcome. Historically, most fisheries have been managed on a "top-down" command 
and control basis. Government officials consult with scientists to create regulations that 
are imposed upon fishenllen. There is a trend now in fisheries management to create new 
types of "bottom-up" management, with the fishennen themselves taking part in policy 
formation. The Maine soft-shell clam industry is one of the first areas where this type of 
management has taken place, and the area around the St. George River is the first formal 
multi-town ordinance in the state. The following chapter will detail its development and 
implementation. 
Chapter 5 
THE GEORGES RIVER PROGRAM 
The Historic Fishery 
The St. George River is located in mid-coast Maine and flows through Knox and 
Waldo counties. The head of the tide is located in Warren. From here the river flows 
through the towns of Cushing, Thomaston, South Thomaston, and Saint George. The 
river's drainage area covers 182 square miles at Warren and 258 square miles at its 
mouth. The tidal portion of the river houses 3800 acres of clam flats. 
Exact landings figures by town for any part of the state of Maine are difficult to 
obtain prior to 1997, although statewide landings are available. Any estimate of landings 
specific to the Georges River area prior to 1997 is subject to a certain degree of 
inaccuracy. However, it is possible to make a good estimate by combining what landings 
data are available with anecdotal evidence from local diggers and residents. Using this 
method, Shennan Hoyt of The Georges River Clam Restoration Project estimates that 
annual commercial soft-shell clam production for the towns of Cushing, St. George, 
Thomaston, and South Thomaston approached 30,000 bushels from 1975-1 985. By 
1994, less than 7,000 bushels of clams were being harvested from these towns (Sherman 
Hoyt, personal communication) 
Water Quality Improvements 
Much of the.following section comes from a personal interview with Larry 
Pritchett, a member of the Georges River Tidewuter Association. This interview took 
place on August 16, 2001. 
Soft-shell clams are filter feeders, and are not safe for human consumption if 
taken from an area with high levels of bacteria. The state DMR tests water quality along 
the Maine coast and classifies flats as safe or unsafe for shellfish harvesting. The 
harvesting status of flats is linked to local water quality. 
A group of Georges River area stakeholders formed the Georges River Tidewater 
Association in 1988. Their mission statement includes a goal to "help protect and restore 
marine resources and water quality in the estuary through advocacy, public education, 
and environmental monitoring." (1 991 winter Tidewater Association Newsletter). The 
Tidewater Association was responsible for initiating changes in the Georges River 
estuary that made commercial softshell clam harvesting possible. 
In the late eighties, the town of Thomaston's sewage treatment plant was unable 
to meet the wastewater treatment needs of the area. The Tidewater Association 
documented more than 230 apparent violations of federal water pollution control laws 
related to the system. In February of 1990, the Tidewater Association filed notice of a 
citizen's suit against the town of Thomaston for these violations. 
In April of 1990, the Thomaston Board of Selectmen signed a consent agreement 
that legally bound the town to a two-and-a-half-year schedule to correct chronic problen~s 
in the treatment system. 
The Tidewater Association also addressed other pollution sources within the 
estuary. These problems included sewage overflows at the Maine State Prison in 
Thomaston and hundreds of houses with failing septic systems or "straight pipes" in the 
five towns bordering the estuary. 
In their 1992 summer newsletter, the Tidewater Association included a cover 
story on "Clamming, Water Quality, and the Economy". In it, they stated that poor water 
quality was preventing the establishment of a commercial clam fishery in the area. They 
also stated that estimated landings for such a fishery would be $1.5 million (in 1991 
dollars), and that total economic impact to the area could exceed $7 million (these figures 
were based on early eighties landings data). The Tidewater Association suggested six 
ways in which water quality could be improved and the clan1 fishery restored. The first 
five dealt with code enforcement, local water quality testing, and improving and 
inspecting local septic systems. The sixth suggestion was to "Consider Multi-Town 
Shellfish Commission." Because clam flats in one town can easily be contaminated from 
pollution sources in a neighboring town, they favored a multi-town approach to 
management for the Georges River estuary. 
Georges River Clam Prqiect/Steerina Committee 
The Tidewater Association kept working to improve water quality. By 1994, the 
major pollution sources had been dealt with. DMR tests would soon document the 
improved water quality and re-open the flats to commercial digging. These tests were 
scheduled to be completed for the entire Georges River by late May of 1996. 
Sherman Hoyt, a resident of St. George, knew that the flats that were about to be 
opened. He saw that the flats had the potential to support a long-term sustainable fishery, 
and worried that the clams would be depleted unless the towns acted quickly. Anyone 
with a valid Maine commercial shellfish harvesting license can harvest clams from any 
town's open flats unless the town has an approved ordinance prohibiting them from doing 
so. By the mid 199OSs, many communities had enacted ordinances limiting harvesting to 
residents. A group of St. George residents had attempted to establish a clam management 
plan for their town in 1983 (St. George town records). However, their efforts were 
unsuccessful, and none of the towns along the estuary had town ordinances. 
The flats along the estuary had been closed for years, and were full of mature 
clams. This bounty of clams would entice many commercial diggers to the area. Hoyt 
doubted the fishery would last long under the pressure of unmanaged harvesting. 
Hoyt began attending local selectmen's meetings to discuss the possibility of a 
multi-town management program. At these meetings, he would bring up the concept, and 
discuss what each town could bring to the program. Although Warren was in the fresh 
water portion of the estuary and had no clam flats, its residents impacted water quality for 
the entire area. St. George had the largest acreage of flats, but very few harvesters. Hoyt 
emphasized each town's importance, using the tidal portion of the river as the unifying 
ecological system they all shared. Some residents expressed concerns about how all the 
details would be worked out. Some of the towns were already cooperating on municipal 
issues. Cushing, Thomaston and South George had a joint K-12 school district (SAD 
50). Thomaston and South Thomaston worked together with Owl's Head to administer a 
joint solid waste transfer station. A resident at one meeting commented "If we can't get 
3 towns together on a school budget, how will we get 5 towns together to manage 
clamming?" Selectmen were already busy with other municipal duties. However, they 
realized their residents were losing potential income as a result of the closed fishery. 
Selectmen in each of the towns said they were willing to support the program if Hoyt was 
willing to do the work. 
He also discussed the concept with area residents and clam harvesters, and found 
them receptive to the idea. When the river was closed, many local harvesters began 
digging for depuration companies. A number of harvesters felt they had been treated 
unfairly, and resented so much profit from area clams going to an out-of-town company 
(Spimey Creek located in Eliot). They were anxious to get the river open to commercial 
harvesting so they could dig for themselves again. When commercial clam harvesting 
had taken place in the area, harvesters had traditionally worked the entire estuary rather 
than staying within one town. Developing a plan for the entire estuary made sense to 
harvesters. 
In July of 1995, Hoyt created the Georges River Clam Fishery Restoration 
Project. University of Maine Cooperative Extension allowed him to use space at their 
office, and helped him form a steering committee of local residents. He worked out of 
the county extension office and used their computers to write grant proposals to support 
the project. 
All grants had to go to a legal non-profit entity, and the Island Institute performed 
this role. The first grant came from the Maine Community Foundation to purchase a 
computer. The first big grant was from the Betterment Foundation for $30,000 over two 
years. Support was also received from local businesses, the towns of St. George and 
Thomaston, and other philanthropic organizations. By October of 1995, the Project had 
generated $38,000 in support. These funds would allow the Project to hire Shennan Hoyt 
as a full-time facilitator in 1996 (personal communication with Shennan Hoyt). 
The first meeting of the Georges River Clam Fishery Restoration Project took 
place on April 5, 1995. A 10-person steering committee was present, including Hoyt, 
Ron Aho (DMR's area biologist), county extension agents, and local residents. The first 
item discussed was the decision making process. Several members described the benefits 
of a "consensus approach" to decision making, where all stakeholders are allowed to 
present their opinions and concerns. This method was adopted by the group, although it 
was decided that only members of the steering committee would be allowed to vote on 
issues (April 5, 1995 Restoration Project meeting minutes). 
The restoration program was created according to the extension model, where the 
goal is to provide guidance and support and eventually to phase out involvement. The 
steering comn~ittee's goal was to restore the clam fishery in the Georges River, and to 
help to establish a local management system to sustain the resource over time. From the 
very beginning, the steering committee's goal was to help establish a management regime 
that would eventually be self-supporting. 
The next step was to decide what sort of management program would best suit the 
area. Roger Gagne was present at the first meeting. He was a commercial harvester, and 
worked for Spinney Creek as a depuration crew supervisor. He advocated working with 
Spinney Creek to continue depuration digging on a larger scale in the river. Gagne 
discussed the efficiency of depuration digging, where all harvest is strictly controlled to 
allow for maximum productivity of the flats. Although Aho pointed out the increased 
safety of depuration digging, the group decided against this option. Locals were not 
generally in favor of depuration digging, and the group wanted to develop a more 
traditional program (April 5, 1995 Restoration Project meeting minutes). 
In 1996, Tom Howell of Spinney Creek sent a letter to the St. George town 
manager suggesting that the town reject the proposed multi-town ordinance in favor of an 
exclusive arrangement with Spinney Creek. St. George has the largest acreage of 
productive flats within the estuary. In return for this arrangement, Spinney Creek would 
pay a per-bushel surcharge of $5.00 per bushel. The proposal was rejected (personal 
communication with Bob Dennison, July 25,2001). 
The project initiated and provided leadership in organizing a statewide conference 
"Improving Municipal Clam Management in Maine" in December of 1995. This was the 
largest Maine shellfish conference to take place since 1946. It produced eight working 
groups that met statewide during January and February to define problems and 
recommend solutions. A second industry work session occurred as part of the Maine 
Fishermen's Forum in February of 1996. While at these sessions, steering committee 
members were able to brainstorm with people involved in shellfish management from all 
over the state. These discussions influenced the development of the Georges River 
Program. 
Hoyt spoke with Alan Houston, who was in charge of Brunswick's management 
program. Brunswick had been involved in a multi-town reciprocal harvesting agreement. 
At the time Hoyt and Houston spoke, it had recently been dissolved due to differences of 
opinion between the towns. Hoyt realized that having a reciprocal harvesting agreement 
without one unified management plan could create problems, and proposed a program in 
which one ordinance governed the entire estuary. He spoke with the Maine Municipal 
Association about the structure of interlocal agreements. These agreements are governed 
by a joint board with selectmen from each of the towns involved. Hoyt proposed 
combining a joint board with a shellfish committee. He knew that the selectmen on the 
joint board were not knowledgeable about clam harvesting, and would benefit from the 
input of a shellfish committee. Being familiar with fisheries management theory, he also 
knew that the harvesters would be more likely to adhere to a program in which they 
played an active role. 
The Project helped to f o m ~  the Joint Board, with a selectman from each of the five 
towns, and the Shellfish Committee comprised of local harvesters. These two groups 
began to meet in the spring of 1996. Their first task was to draft the interlocal agreement 
and ordinance. Bob Dennison, the selectman from St. George, was adamant that 
decision-making power be shared by the two bodies. He included language in the 
ordinance that stated that a unanimous vote of the Shellfish Committee could only be 
overruled by a unanimous vote of the Joint Board. He stressed that the harvesters would 
have no incentive to participate in management if they did not have a say in it (personal 
con~munication with Bob Dennison and Sherman Hoyt). 
Dennison drafted the original interlocal agreement, which detailed the towns' 
responsibilities. Its stated intent was to preserve the clam resource for present and future 
diggers. both commercial and recreational. It included sections on administration, 
finance, property, personnel, arbitration, and amendments. 
The original agreement authorized the Joint board to "set the number of shellfish 
licenses to be issued, establish license fees, open and close the flats, set times when 
digging is allowed, set permitted quantities that may be harvested." However, it also 
stated that recommendations of the Shellfish Management Committee should be 
approved by the Joint board unless a unanimous vote of the Joint Board decides 
otherwise. In practice, the SMC would make the above decisions with few exceptions. 
The Joint Board would be composed of one selectman from each of the 5 towns. 
At least 3 of these selectmen were needed to create a quorum so that a vote could occur. 
A g&erning municipality would have administrative responsibilities. This town 
would receive 10% of total license sales to offset administrative costs. All other funds 
(remaining license fees, fines, fundraising moneys and donations) are held in a joint 
shellfish ordinance account by the treasurer of the administrative municipality. The 
original governing n~unicipality was Thomaston, which was later changed to St. George. 
The shellfish warden was to be employed by the administrative municipality. 
(However, in practice it was the SMC that would write the job description for and hire 
the warden, who would report to the Thomaston Chief of Police) The Shellfish 
Committee and Joint Board began regular meetings in May of 1996. 
The Shellfish Committee was responsible for the management ordinance. 
Sherman Hoyt brought a copy of Darmariscotta's ordinance to the committee to use as a 
guide. There were similarities between the two programs, as Damariscotta has reciprocal 
harvesting agreements with neighboring towns. The management ordinance was written 
by Butch Taylor (chairman of the SMC), Cliff Weaver and Ron Stone (SMC members) 
with advice from Ron Aho and Sherman Hoyt. The ordinance limits the commercial 
harvest per digger to 4 bushels per tide, prohibits Monday and night digging, and sets 
licensing procedures. It also sets standard penalties and fines for violation of the rules of 
the ordinance. It outlines the structure and duties of the SMC, which is to be composed 
of three residents from each of the communities, "at least two of whom shall be 
commercial diggers appointed by the selectmen of the municipalities." 
The Interlocal Agreement was approved by each of the towns in mid April, 1996. 
Harold Winters, watershed manager for the DMR, approved The Georges River Regional 
Shelltish Management Ordinance as written on April 22, 1996. 
Water testing continued, and a large area was deemed safe for harvesting in late 
spring of 1996. At the request of the Joint Board, DMR temporarily delayed opening the 
area to digging while details were hammered out between the towns. 
The SMC had to decide how many licenses would be issued. Ron Aho supplied 
them with landings data from 1995, which suggested that somewhere between 13 and 78 
licenses be issued, depending on how many bushels harvesters would be allowed, and 
how many days they would be allowed to work. 
Bob Dennison of the Joint Board advocated unlimited licenses with a restricted 
season. He said all residents have a right to the resource, and that basic economics would 
ensure that the resource would not be overharvested. Once landings began to fall, people 
would decrease their harvesting effort, and stocks would rebound. Cliff Weaver of the 
Shellfish Committee advocated limiting the number of licenses with a small reduction in 
the number of fishing days (personal communications with Bob Dennison and Cliff 
Weaver). The SMC favored this proposal. 
Eventually, the SMC used a combination of 1996 survey data, historical landings 
data, "gut instincts", and the number of people in the community interested in a license 
to arrive at a figure of 128 commercial licenses. Because this figure was substantially 
higher than the figure Aho recommended, they prohibited digging on Mondays. They 
also required that "conservation tin~e" be completed in order to be eligible for a license. 
Recreational licenses were not limited. 
128 commercial licenses were issued on July 8 via a lottery. Per state law, 10% of 
these were sold to non-residents. On July 10, over 500 acres of flats were approved for 
open digging by the DMR. 
The SMC organized numerous fundraisers to support the program and pay the 
warden's salary and expenses. They hired a warden in August, and purchased a boat, 
motor, and a used police cruiser for his use. 
In September of 1996, the SMC reported that the diggers and warden were getting 
along well. Only one license was revoked, due to failure to show proof of residency. 
Enforcement issues did not seem to be a problem at this time (SMC meeting minutes, 
September 5, 1996). 
Harvesters and residents seemed enthusiastic about the program. The SMC kept 
up weekly meetings to discuss the program and keep it going. On September 4, the 
Committee recommended to the Joint Board that Maple Juice Cove be closed due to an 
abundance of juvenile seed clams. This recommendation was accepted and went into 
effect on September 23. 
The SMC joined with the Tidewater Association at a fundraiser in July, and held a 
public supper and a raffle in October. They also put on a hunter's breakfast in 
November. Spinney Creek paid a per-bushel surcharge to Thomaston (the administrative 
municipality for the program) for all depuration digging conducted in any of the five 
towns. These monies supplemented those received from license sales. The SMC seemed 
committed to raising the necessary funds to keep the program going. These fundraisers 
continued over the coming year. 
Scott Tilton, a member of the SMC as well as the Restoration Project Steering 
Committee, developed a conservation time policy manual. In it, he outlined the types of 
activities that would qualify as conservation time. In April of 1997, the first reseeding 
event took place. Five bushels of seed were taken from Broad Cove and placed in Maple 
Juice Cove, which remained closed. 
In their April 7, 1997 meeting, the SMC noted that communication with the Joint 
Board had deteriorated. They decided that they would discuss this issue and how it could 
be improved with the Joint Board, and present the results at a future meeting. The 
warden was also discussed. Having the warden report to the Thomaston Chief of Police 
seemed to be creating some problems. The police department did not share the same 
vision of the warden's responsibilities as the SMC. This issue would become more 
important in the months to come. 
Butch Taylor, the original chairman of the SMC, resigned in October of 1997. He 
did not give a specific reason for his resignation, and continued to serve on the committee 
(October 20, 1997 SMC meeting minutes). 
In late 1997 and early 1998, the SMC dealt with their first major conflict: "The 
Wonner Issue". Soft-shell clams often occur in the same areas as marine worms. Worm 
harvesters turn the mud in the same way as do clam harvesters. Clam harvesters claimed 
that this practice "turned the mud to soup", left seed clams exposed to the elements, and 
often made it impossible for them to conduct their business. They also complained that 
the fishery was largely unregulated, and wondered why they were subject to conservation 
restrictions while wormers were not. Clammers found it particularly vexing that wormers 
were able to harvest in areas closed to clam harvesting for conservation reasons (personal 
communication with Shennan Hoyt). 
With both types of harvesting taking place in the same area, problems were bound 
to occur, and they did. On August 22, 1997, the chainnan of the SMC sent a letter to 
Robin Alden, Commissioner of the Department of Marine Resources. In it he said that 
the SMC "is facing a serious problem that if not dealt with in a timely manner has the 
potential of erupting into a violent situation." He stressed the need "to respond quickly to 
address these concerns in order to head off the growing threat of violence." He stated a 
strong belief that both fisheries could coexist, and made several recommendations to the 
commissioner that would help this to happen. She responded in early October by asking 
the Maine Soft-shell Clam Council to establish a subcommittee to deal with the issue. 
The subcommittee would include a small group of stakeholders including both the worm 
and clam industries, selected members of the Council, DMR staff and local legislative 
representatives. 
In November of 1997, the SMC's monthly newsletter included a section 
"Working with Wormers". The article was written by Scott Tilton, the newly-appointed 
committee chair. He discussed the recommendations Taylor had made to the 
commissioner, and the resulting subcommittee. Cliff Weaver, a member of the SMC, had 
been attending the subcommittee's meetings, as had Sherman Hoyt. Hoyt was quoted as 
saying "Cliff has really expressed the clammer's position very well. And the wormers 
are responding in an incredibly positive way. There is a mutual understanding that yes, 
there are problems, but an agreement can be reached." 
Another problem was developing at the same time. Neil Pollis, the warden 
originally hired by the SMC, suffered from health problems, and had been unable to work 
over the summer. A temporary part-time warden had been hired, but he resigned in 
November. This left the towns without an enforcement officer. The warden issue had 
always been somewhat of a problem, as the Thomaston Police Department did not 
supervise the warden in the way the SMC would have liked (personal communication 
with Shellfish Committee Members, September 10,2001). 
Clam harvesting slows down in the winter months, and the issue was not 
addressed officially until February, 1998. In a February 5 letter to the Joint Board, the 
Restoration Project expressed concern over the lack of an enforcement officer. They 
suggested "If this issue cannot be resolved by the current administrative municipality, we 
would suggest considering changing the administrative responsibility from Thomaston to 
another town in the five-town region, perhaps St. George. It is ultimately the 
responsibility of the Joint Board to assure that the resource is appropriately managed, and 
at this point, the resource is at risk" 
The administrative municipality was changed to St. George, and the Joint Board 
assumed the responsibility of hiring the shellfish warden. Neil Pollis, who had recovered 
from his health problems, was rehired. He would report to St. George town manager 
John Falla, who was also a member of the Joint Board. At the same time, the Joint Board 
assumed control of other issues that had been traditionally left to the SMC. Although the 
interlocal agreement stated that budgeting and fiscal issues were the responsibility of the 
Joint Board, the SMC had been handling these issues. The warden's salary was the 
largest expense, and with the SMC handling this expense, it seemed natural that they 
would handle other money issues as well. 
John Falla would regularly sit in on Joint Board meetings. The Joint Board and 
the administrative n~unicipality (St. George) became a much more cohesive unit. The 
Joint Board became more involved in warden issues. When the issue of benefits was 
raised, it was the Joint Board, not the administrative municipality, that decided he would 
not receive benefits due to budget shortfalls. The Joint Board gradually became more 
involved in fiscal issues. In early 1998, the SMC asked the Joint Board to request $2000 
from each town to support the program (SMC meeting minutes, March 16, 1998). A 
stipulation was made that this money would be returned the following year if it was not 
needed. The request was made. With the programs receiving money from the towns, the 
Joint Board reasoned it was their responsibility to monitor where these moneys went 
(personal communication with Bob Dennison, July 25, 2001). The SMC voted on March 
23 to rescind the request for money, but the money had already been received from St. 
George, and would soon be received from the other towns. 
By March, absences were becoming a problem at SMC meetings. The committee 
needed 8 members present in order to have a quorum to vote on issues, so with low 
attendance, the SMC could not make recommendations to the Joint Board. Committee 
members were also disappointed that no Joint Board members attended their meetings 
(SMC meeting minutes, March 16, 1998). 
In their March 30 meeting, the committee expressed their grave disappointment 
that the Joint Board had overturned a recommendation that the SMC had presented them 
with unanimous support. (This recommendation was that the SMC be involved with the 
evaluation of the warden's job performance. This motion had passed 1 1-0.) The SMC 
expressed a desire for the warden to increase his presence on the flats, and check diggers 
more frequently to look for undersized clams and enforce the four-bushel limit. In their 
June 29 meeting, a number of committee members expressed disappointment with the job 
performance of the warden. The disappointment centered on the fact that people were 
digging in conservation areas, the four-bushel limit was not being enforced, and 
unlicensed digging was taking place. They forwarded a letter to the St. George town 
manager, who responded that they would consider hiring another part-time warden. The 
SMC was not pleased with this solution, as they saw the problem not as a lack of 
manpower, but as a lack of desire to enforce the rules. 
In August, the situation improved when Pollis took "brave and decisive action" 
(SMC meeting minutes, August 17, 1998) against several individuals who were violating 
the ordinance. The SMC wrote a letter of commendation to Pollis for his recent law 
enforcement activities. 
In April of 1999, Scott Tilton resigned as chair of the SMC. He was working long 
hours at two other jobs, and said he was no longer able to commit to the 10 - 15 hours 
each week necessary to chair the SMC. He was replaced by Peter Hope. 
In the spring of 1999, the Georges River Clam Fishery Restoration Project ceased 
to meet. They deemed that they had completed their responsibilities, and the Joint Board 
and SMC were functioning well on their own. Sherman Hoyt began a full-time position 
with the county extension office, and continued to operate as an advisor to the SMC and 
Joint Board. 
There were no major conflicts to resolve at this time, and the SMC began to meet 
less frequently. With no control over the finances, they did not plan as many fundraisers, 
although they did take part once again in the July 4th river festival. Reseeding and 
shoreline cleanup events continued. 
The next major conflict occurred in the spring of 200 1. A clam harvester who 
was also a member of the SMC was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting. He 
claimed to have dug clams that were allegedly dug by his son in excess of the four-bushel 
limit. The shellfish warden witnessed the event, and claimed the father was lying. He 
brought the father before municipal court, where he was fined (author's notes from Joint 
Board meeting, February 8,2001). 
Language in the management ordinance stated that anyone who used his license to 
deliberately aid and abet another to violate the laws of the ordinance would lose their 
license for a period of 12 months in addition to paying a $1000 fine upon conviction. 
However, the father claimed that when he pled guilty in municipal court, the judge 
assured him that the fine was his only penalty (author's notes from Joint Board meeting 
February 8,2001). The SMC was adamant that he should lose his license, since this 
penalty was clearly stated in the ordinance. The father claimed that he did not know this, 
which the SMC did not believe since he was present when the ordinance was written and 
approved on an annual basis. 
The Joint Board originally revoked the father's license. However, he appealed the 
decision on the basis of what he had been told in municipal court. He claimed he would 
not have pled guilty had he known he would lose his license. The Joint Board decided to 
reinstate his licenses despite the objections of the SMC. 
Another contentious issue has been the money that the program receives from the 
towns. The SMC wanted to return to a self-supporting structure, and wanted to regain 
control over financial expenditures. The Joint Board insisted that the town money was a 
necessary part of the program, and that they were most qualified to handle money 
manners. Peter Hope resigned his chairmanship in the spring of 2001 as a result of the 
money issue and the "aiding and abetting" incident. He was replaced by Dwayne Hunt. 
The SMC originally met infrequently throughout the spring and summer of 2001, 
but increased the frequency of their meetings late in the year. Bob Dennison resigned his 
chairmanship of the Joint Board in 2001, and was replaced by Steve Miller, an area 
fisherman. He seems to be fimi in his administering of the ordinance. Several diggers 
had not fulfilled their conservation time requirement in time for the 2001-2002 season, 
and were not entered into the lottery to receive licenses. They appealed this decision, and 
Miller denied the appeal, arguing "they knew the rules as well as anyone else." The SMC 
seems pleased so far with his management. There have been no major conflicts so far 
under his management of the Joint Board. 
Chapter 6 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Fisheries Mana~ement and Fisheries Economics Tradition 
Modem economic analysis of fisheries began with Gordon (1 954) and Schaeffer 
(1 957). Prior (and often subsequent) to these authors, the goal of fisheries management 
was to harvest the greatest biomass possible without impacting the long-term 
sustainability of the resource. However, Gordon pointed out that focusing on maximizing 
catch without accounting for the costs of fishing results in inefficiency. Schaeffer 
showed this graphically with the "Schaeffer Curve". He assumed total cost is a linear 
function of fishing effort, and showed that fishing effort should not continue to the point 
of the largest sustainable catch. As fishing effort increases, catch increases at a 
decreasing rate, so more resources are used to catch each successive fish than the one 
before it. Fishing effort should stop at the point of the maxiniuni distance between total 
cost and total benefits. This point, the optimum economic yield, will occur before 
maximum sustainable yield is reached (Schaeffer, 1957). See Figures 1 - 3. 
Biomass vs. Change in Biomass (growth rate) 
Biomass 
* represents the maximum growth rate of the stock 
Figure 1 
Effort vs. Catch 
Effort 
Represents MSY. The axis on this graph has been flipped. Zero effort occurs at 




Dashed line to the left shows the maximum distance between total revenue and total 
costs, which occurs before MSY, the dashed line to the right. 
Gordon argued that fisheries are inefficient because fish stocks are common 
property. If the stocks were owned or controlled by someone, fishing effort would stop 
where marginal costs are equal to marginal revenue. However, fishermen have no 
incentive to stop at this point. They know that others will continue to harvest, and are 
therefore driven to do the same. As a result, they keep fishing until average cost equals 
average benefit, and no rents are realized. 
Schaeffer (1957) showed a dynamic relationship between a stock's biomass and 
its rate of growth. Over time, a stock's reduction (death and catch) is matched by its 
growth (recruitment and individual growth) so that total biomass reaches an equilibrium. 
When biomass is small, growth rate is high, and when biomass is high, growth rate is 
small. 
Schaeffer then showed a relationship between fishing effort and harvest level 
(production). Initially, as effort increases, catch increases. The growth rate will increase 
to compensate for lost biomass. However if effort increases beyond a certain point, it 
will reduce the biomass of the stock so that growth rate is not able to keep up with 
harvest. Biomass and landings will decrease. 
A "Schaeffer curve" can be drawn by plotting fishing effort on the x axis versus 
catch on the y axis. The top of the "Schaeffer curve" represents the maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) for a stock. If the goal of a fishery is to remove as much biomass as 
possible, then this is the point for which management should aim. It represents the 
largest catch that can be perpetually sustained. If fishing effort increases beyond this 
point, the steady state growth will decrease. The smaller biomass will generate 
inefficiency in the form of increased fishing costs - increasing effort will yield decreasing 
catch. 
Economic efficiency requires that we consider costs as well as revenues. (See 
Figure 3.) Assuming revenue is a constant function of catch (price x catch = revenue), we 
can create a revenueleffort graph by multiplying catch figures on the y axis by price. 
Assuming cost is a constant function of effort, we can plot a total cost ray on this graph. 
The greatest distance between costs and revenues is found by drawing a line tangent to 
the effort curve that is parallel to the cost curve. The tangent point is the point of 
maximum economic yield (MEY). If the goal is to maximize net benefit, it is MEY we 
should aim for. 
Scott (1955) advocated sole ownership of the fishery as a solution to its 
inefficiency problems. He showed that in the short-term, there is little difference in 
efficiency between common and private property. Each fishing boat (whether owned by 
individual fishermen or all operating under a sole owner) will experience increasing costs 
as it attempts to increase landings. Given a fixed number of boats and equipment, 
fishermen will increase their efforts until the price they receive for fish landed is equal to 
the costs they incur in fishing. However, inputs can be adjusted in the long-run. A sole 
owner can determine the optimum number of boats needed to catch fish most efficiently, 
and sell the remaining boats or put them to other use. However, the owner must have 
long-term property rights over the fishery in order to make this possible. 
Beverton and Holt (1 957) showed a relationship between fishing effort, mesh 
size, and equilibrium catch. Mesh size determines the size at which individual fish will 
be recruited to the fishery. Anything small enough to pass through the mesh will escape; 
individuals larger than the mesh will be captured. Establishing a mesh size will change 
the age composition of the catch and hence the stock. Older fish larger than the mesh 
will be removed from the fishery as fishing continues, which will decrease the average 
size of individual fish. 
Beverton and Holt (1957) showed that each mesh size gives a unique relationship 
between effort and catch. For any stock, all mesh sizes can be plotted, and a "eumetric 
envelope" can be drawn to connect them all. The point on each curve that is tangent to 
the eumetric envelope represents the most efficient level of fishing effort for that mesh 
size. 
For any given mesh size, increased fishing effort will initially result in increased 
catch. However, as fishing continues, there are fewer large fish to catch. Also, some 
small fish are caught with every tow. For each mesh size, there is an optimum level of 
fishing effort. If effort increases beyond a certain point, biomass will be reduced and 
landings will fall. At this point, there are only two policy options to increase landings, 
both of which require time before landings increase: 1 .) Stop fishing to allow the stock to 
recover, then resume fishing; or 2.) Establish a larger mesh size and continue to fish. This 
will allow more fish to grow to a size at which they can reproduce. However, it will 
mean fishermen will catch less fish in the short-term. 
Turvey (1964) showed that rents cannot be generated in a fishery unless effort is 
restricted. For any given mesh size, unrestricted effort will increase until total revenue 
equals total cost. Restricting effort alone may generate rents if mesh size remains 
constant. The greatest rents can be realized by choosing the mesh and effort size that 
generate the largest distance between total costs and total revenue. 
Externalities and Government Failure 
An externality occurs when a person making a decision does not bear the full 
economic consequences of his action. External costs or benefits are borne by members of 
society. These costs are not correctly accounted for when deciding how much to produce 
or consume. If the externality is not corrected, the result will be an inefficient allocation 
of resources. 
Lack of secure property rights can cause externalities. Consider for example a 
river that houses both a paper mill and a health spa. The paper mill uses the river as a 
receptacle for toxins produced in its production process. The health spa uses the river to 
attract customers. The mill's toxins lower water quality, which reduces the spa's 
business. However, the mill does not bear the cost of this reduced business, nor does it 
reap the benefits of the increased business a cleaner river would create. As a result, it 
will dump too much waste into the river, and an efficient allocation of river "benefits" 
will not be attained. 
Externalities are present in many natural resources, including fisheries. Because 
no one owns the entire resource, no one bears the full costs of removing from it or 
weakening it, and no one gains the full benefits of protecting it. 
In the early part of the twentieth century, prevailing economic theory suggested 
legislation and taxes as the best way to solve externalities. Taxes were used to stand in 
for the societal cost not accounted for by the individual. A "polluter pays" standard was 
the norm. Companies were made to pay for the costs they imposed on society. If a 
company produced pollution, they would be made to pay a tax equal to the (unaccounted 
for) cost that pollution caused to society. However, Coase (1960) suggested another 
solution. Assuming all resource users have complete infornlation and are capable of 
bargaining, they can solve the problem among themselves, often at lower costs. Coase 
demonstrated this concept with the example of a candy maker and a doctor's office. The 
doctor's practice is negatively impacted by the noise the candy maker produces. 
Traditional theory held that the person making the noise was responsible for the problem, 
and should therefore pay to rectify it. Coase showed that the candy maker can pay the 
doctor to compensate him for his losses, or the doctor can pay the candy maker not to 
make the noise. Either way, the costs that had previously been external to the noise- 
making decision are accounted for. 
Transaction costs are the costs associated with gathering information necessary to 
make a deal, to bargain, and to enforce the terms of the agreement. Calabresi (1968) and 
Dahlman (1 979) expand and clarified Coase's argument to show that it is transaction 
costs that prevent externalities from being solved. Dahlman concludes that our "sad state 
of affairs" is due to positive transaction costs and imperfect information. In fisheries, the 
lack of ownership rights is the primary cause of these externalities. A large part of the 
bargaining that must take place concerns who has rights to the resource. Because these 
rights are unclear, new entrants may emerge at any point and claim that they, too, have 
rights to the resource, and must therefore be allowed to bargain as well. Bargaining 
resources are used up determining ownership rights. These rights can then be challenged 
at any time, resulting in new rounds of bargaining. 
Externalities create market failure. These externalities persist due to transaction 
costs. Much of the government's role is to reduce externalities and restore an efficient 
allocation of resources. However, the government is not immune from, and often has very 
high transaction costs. Inefficiency can persist or even be augmented by government 
attempts to correct it. 
Buchanan (1 988) examined the inefficiencies in government solutions to market 
failure. He determined that "government failure" also occurs. Our government is based 
on the concept of public choice. Individuals are free to make choices based on their own 
cost-benefit calculus. Policy decisions have varying distributional affects. When a group 
of citizens stands to gain by a certain policy, they face an incentive to spend time and 
money to get the policy implemented. The potential losers also face an incentive to 
prevent the policy from being enacted. Potential gains are dissipated in distributional tug- 
of-wars. These battles employ numerous people who then stand to gain by ensuring that 
the tug-of-wars continue. Government inefficiency may dissipate rents, but it also keeps 
many people employed. These people stand to gain by preserving inefficiency. 
Externalities create inefficiency in fishing. Government may be unable to solve 
these inefficiencies. If it is transaction costs that prevent inefficiencies from being solved 
by bargaining, then fishermen and non-governmental entities may be able to create 
institutions to reduce these costs, and therefore reduce the externalities. 
Collective Action and Rational Choice Theory 
Rational individuals make choices by analyzing the potential costs and benefits of 
possible actions. When a group of people must choose how to act, each faces individual 
incentives that may or may not align with collective incentives. A collective action 
problem exists where rational individual action can lead to an inefficient or Pareto- 
inferior outcome (Taylor and Singleton, 1993). The basic question collection action 
theorists try to answer is "Under what circumstances will individuals create rules to 
constrain their behavior for the greater good?" This question was addressed by Mancur 
Olson (1 965). Olson presents an equation of costs and benefits to determine the 
likelihood of successful collective action for any group. The net benefits to the 
individual Ai are equal to the gross benefits Vi minus the costs Ci of organizing the 
collective action to that individual. For any group, If Ai > 0 for some individuals, the 
group is privileged and will likely succeed. Those individuals for whom Ai >O will take 
the steps necessary to initiate collective action. If Ai < 0 for all individuals, the group is 
latent. Individual incentives are not present to induce group cooperation. Collective 
action will not occur unless other incentives are available to induce contributions. 
Olson uses game theory (the Prisoner's Dilemma) to show that it is rational for 
individuals not to cooperate. The payoff for society and each individual would be greater 
if everyone cooperated. However, each individual has no way of making certain that 
others will also cooperate. If some cooperate and others do not, those who choose to 
cooperate will suffer a loss, while those who defect will gain. This logic applies to 
collective action - why should individuals join together and face the risk of abandoning a 
purely self-interested path? Olson also likens collective action to a public good. Public 
goods are characterized by the impossibility of exclusion and the jointness of supply. 
Olson's analysis of collective action depends not on jointness, but only on the 
impossibility of exclusion (R. Hardin, 1982). Once the good is provided, it is available to 
all. Individuals may look at the "good" of collective action as something that will be 
provided regardless of their participation. They may therefore see it in their own best 
interest to "free-ride" off the work of others. 
Olson suggests that the group size greatly impacts the likelihood of successful 
collective action. The smaller the group, the more likely they are to succeed. In a small 
group, each person's contribution is more obvious; individuals see the necessity of their 
cooperation in order for the group to succeed. In a larger group. individuals may feel 
their contribution is but a "drop in the pan". They are more likely to free-ride, assuming 
enough others will contribute to accomplish the task. Smaller groups are better able to 
monitor and sanction free-riders more effectively. 
Olson identifies three possible "incentives" that make collective action more 
likely: irrational behavior, selective incentives of the by-product theory, and political 
entrepreneurship. Selective incentives such as membership benefits make collective 
action attractive enough to warrant the risks associated with it. These are linked to a by- 
product theory because many of the incentives come about only urfter the group is 
organized. Russell Hardin points out that because of this, many selective incentives do 
not explain what prompts groups to cooperate in the first place. Hardin places more 
emphasis on the importance of the political entrepreneur. Political entrepreneurs are 
people who, for their own career reasons, find it in their private interest to work to 
provide collective benefits to relevant groups. Political entrepreneurs work in one of two 
ways. They may be candidates for elective office who organize a group for political 
support. They may also found or expand an organization because their own careers will 
be enhanced by the size and prosperity of their organization. 
Institutional Economics 
The question "Under what circumstances will individuals agree to restrain their 
behavior in the best interest of society" is also addressed by institutional economists. 
Their work ties in with collective action theory because CAPS are often solved by the 
development of an institution. In both institutional development and CAP solution, 
individuals are trying to lower transaction costs. 
There is a consensus among institutional economists that institutions and norms 
emerge as a way to coordinate behavior. Whether transacting with an ally, a competitor, 
or a trading partner, the process will work better if both parties have an idea of how the 
other will behave. Norms and institutions provide this sort of information. 
In a two-person "game" or transaction, each party has a range of actions they can 
take. Each player's payoff is affected by their own choice as well as that of their 
opponent. The game is said to be in Nash equilibrium if each player's strategy is a best 
reply to his opponent's strategy. The question is: How do two players coordinate their 
play when they don't know what to expect from their opponent? 
Sugden argues that players are somehow able, through experience and 
imagination, to signal each other what "type" of player they are. Over repeated plays, 
players note patterns in their opponents' strategy, and respond accordingly. Many games 
have several different equilibria. Because all players prefer to be at one of the stable 
equilibria, some of them will eventually focus on one of these equilibria, and the others 
will follow suit, which establishes a convention on how to play the game. 
Sugden points out that there may be any number of equilibria in a game, with 
varying distributions of payoff, and that conventions could develop to attain any one of 
them. Any one of these conventions establishes an equilibrium, but no single one is 
prescribed as the solution. When people follow a particular convention, "they are guided 
by something more than the axioms of rational choice, as economists normally 
understand them." 
Sugden suggests this "something more" is prominence. "Some ways of 
coordinating behavior seem to strike people as more obvious than others: this is the 
property of prominence. If people can coordinate their behavior without communicating 
with one another, they must be drawing - consciously or unconsciously - on some fund 
of ideas that they have in common." He goes on to suggest that the most important of 
such ideas is common experience. Common experience allows individuals to predict 
how others will act, and to choose their own action accordingly. People will follow 
conventions based on common experience in order to coordinate their behavior. 
Sugden's argument meshes nicely with that of Singleton and Taylor - individuals with 
common norms and experiences are more likely to coordinate their behavior to form an 
institution and to overcome a CAP. 
Knight's (1 992) theory is somewhat different. Although Sugden does mention 
that equilibrium points will often result in distributional inequities, Knight focuses on 
these inequities. Knight argues that social norms and institutions are developed as a 
result of people trying to maximize their individual gains. Any situation may have 
multiple solutions, and each of these solutions will benefit certain individuals more than 
others. People want to acquire as many assets as they can. People struggle to get rules 
that help them to do this, and they do this by bargaining. When one person has more 
power (in the form of assets) than another, he has a leg-up in bargaining. Therefore, once 
a situation exists where one person has more power than another, he is in a strong 
position to keep this power. 
According to Knight, rules emerge as a by-product of the conflict over 
distribution. Individuals want to increase their assets. Since everyone recognizes that 
everyone else is also trying to increase assets, the best way to acquire a bigger share of 
the available assets is by constraining the choices of others. People who are in power at 
the outset are obviously in a better position to do so. Those with minimal assets are apt 
to go along with these constraints, since they realize they lack the assets to make a better 
bargain. They will therefore abide by the rules imposed upon them, even though they're 
not obviously to their advantage. Rules are rarely completely fair - they almost always 
benefit some more than others. 
Enforcing these rules can be costly, and can drain the resources of those in power 
to varying degrees. If a rule is very "unfair", those who suffer from it are more likely to 
rebel, raising enforcement costs. The constant interplay of benefits gained from 
inequitable rules and their enforcement costs can cause shifts in relative power. Knight 
says that norms are established from these shifts in power. 
Communal Action Dilemmas and Natural Resources: 
The rational choice and institutional economics discussions above examine two 
questions pertinent to this thesis: 1 .) What circumstances will facilitate group 
cooperation; and 2.) How will rules come about to constrain individual behavior. A 
number of scholars have examined the fom~er question as it pertains to natural resources. 
Garrett Hardin (1 968) made the "Tragedy of the Comn~ons" a catch phrase by 
discussing collective action problems in natural resources. Hardin argued that any 
resource held in common will inevitably be overexploited. Hardin suggested two possible 
solutions to the "tragedy": open access resources should be privatized, or they should be 
regulated by the state. These two solutions were thought of as the only way to manage 
fisheries for much of the twentieth century. 
The concept of access to common resources is not as simple as Hardin suggests. 
Schlager and Ostrom (1 992) point out that it is important to define the types of property 
rights and access rights associated with a marine resource. Property rights can be divided 
into four basic types: private property, where an individual or corporation can exclude 
others from using the resource and can regulate its use; state property, where government 
holds and controls the rights to manage and use the resource; open access, where there 
are no well-defined property rights; and communal property, where the resource is held 
by an identifiable number of users who can exclude others and regulate use. (Berkes et al. 
1989). 
Hardin (1 968) didn't acknowledge the presence of communal property. In fact, 
he used an example of communal property in his discussion of open access. He assumes 
any resource not owned by private individuals or the state is open access by default. 
However, situations in which local user groups have turned open-access resources into 
communal property are not uncommon (Berkes et al. 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Acheson, 
1998, among others). Communal property is not a recent phenomenon (see Eggertsson, 
l992), although recognition of it as a solution to the problem of open access is. 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) define four types of rights that can be held over 
coastal fishery resources: access and withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation. 
Table 1 
Property Rights and Resource Users 
Taken from Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
They determine the likelihood of efficient harvesting rules increases as resource 
users gain more rights. However, they dispute the traditional economic argument that 
private ownership is the only way to ensure efficient resource utilization. People are 
more likely to invest in a resource if they know they will capture the benefits of their 
investment. The right of exclusion offers an important incentive for both owners and 
proprietors to make czirrent investments in a resource. Owners and proprietors can 
decide who can and cannot access a resource, and are therefore reasonably assured that 
they and their offspring will benefit from their investments. Owners have the additional 
benefit of being able to sell their rights to the resource, which allows them to capture the 
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Individuals' discount rate will also influence how much they are willing to invest 
in a resource. Someone who values the future is more likely to invest in it. Conservation 
laws are, in a way, investments in the future of a resource. Clark (1 973) showed that a 
high discount rate can provide justification for harvesting animal species to the point of 
extinction. In general, low discount rates provide incentives for conservation. 
It wasn't until the late eighties that academics began to acknowledge that many 
small user groups had developed institutions to manage resources and to determine their 
allocation (Acheson, 1997; Wade, 1988; Baland and Plateau, 1996). Many of these 
institutions had gone conlpletely unrecognized by the communities' government despite 
their success. 
Taylor and Singleton (1993) address the importance of transaction costs in 
collective action problems (CAP). They note that unresolved collective action problems, 
or unrealized gains from cooperation, exist because of transaction costs. If it were not for 
these costs, rational actors would find ways to secure all the gains to be had from 
cooperation. They examine the factors that must exist for a group to solve a CAP 
endogenously (without outside assistance), and suggest this can only be done in groups 
with sufficient endogenous transaction resources to overcome the transaction costs. 
The authors identify three phases to CAP solution. First, the parties must identi@ 
the possibilities for cooperation. Second, the parties must agree on one scheme of 
cooperation, which will involve bargaining. Third, the agreement will have to be 
monitored and enforced. Each of these phases has costs in the form of search costs, 
bargaining costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs. These are the transaction costs 
of solving a CAP. 
They suggest that a strong sense of community makes overcoming a CAP more 
likely by reducing transaction costs and by increasing a group's endogenous transaction 
resources. They define community as a group of people having stability of relations, 
multiplex relations, direct relations, and shared beliefs and preferences. These conditions 
lower the uncertainty from which transaction costs are derived. Search costs are lower 
because identifying the possibilities for cooperation is easier when the group's members 
know each other and have multiplex relations. Bargaining costs are lower because shared 
beliefs and preferences reduce the range over which bargaining must take place, because 
stability makes it easier to conclude agreements and reduces the need for renegotiation, 
and because multiplex relations provide possibilities for trade-offs that compensate for 
differences in cooperative gains between the parties. Third, and most importantly 
according to the authors, monitoring and enforcement costs are reduced by shared beliefs 
and preferences, the stability of group membership, the expectation of continued 
interaction, and the directness and multiplexity of relations. "The more relations between 
the members of a group resemble those characteristics of a community, the lower are the 
transaction costs they must face - and hence the fewer the transaction resources they 
must expend - in order to solve a given CAP." Taylor and Singleton also point out that 
economic inequality and cultural heterogeneity tend to weaken community and therefore 
increase transaction costs. 
One aspect of community that they consider very important is a shared system of 
norms. They define social norms as shared standards, and suggest that people conform to 
norms due to both the threat of sanctions as well as the belief that it is right to conform to 
them. Because of this latter aspect, having a shared sense of norms may actually prevent 
having to enact sanctions, thereby preventing expenditure of transaction resources. 
Taylor and Singleton bring up Olson's concept of a political entrepreneur. They 
state that a political entrepreneur must strengthen a group's sense of community in order 
to bring about collective action. The entrepreneur's role is to facilitate coordination and 
negotiation of an agreement and perhaps to monitor compliance with it. However, a 
political entrepreneur cannot enforce the agreement. Enforcement must come from 
within the comn~unity or from the state. 
The amount of "community" present in a group will impact how much outside 
assistance is necessary in order to overcome a CAP. The authors describe various 
possibilities, from wholly-endogenous solutions to those that are imposed upon the group 
by an outside force. However, they believe that unless some of the characteristics of 
community are present in a group, the CAP will not be solved. A community has 
characteristics that reduce transaction costs enough so that they can be met from 
resources within the community. As the degree of community within a group weakens, 
more steps will be required to overcome a CAP. The authors state the first step will be 
internal division of political labor in arbitrating, monitoring, and enforcing an agreement; 
then the assistance of a political entrepreneur, and eventually recourse to the resources of 
the state. 
Ostrom (1 990) describes the basic conditions that should be met for communal 
action dilemmas to be solved. She distills these conditions down to a set of 8 design 
principles: 
Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households with rights to 
withdraw resource units from the common-pool resource and the 
boundaries of the common-pool resource itself are clearly defined. 
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions: Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or 
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision 
rules requiring labor, material, and/or money. 
Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the 
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. 
Monitoring: Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and 
appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the 
appropriators. 
Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are 
likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness 
and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable 
to these appropriators, or by both. 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have 
rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among 
appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
Minimal recongnition of rights to organize: The rights of appropriators to 
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental 
authorities. 
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: 
8. Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, 
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterprises. 
Ostrom's design principles overlap with the conclusions of other research on 
common pool resources and communal action dilemmas. Agrawal(2002), Ostrom 
(1 990, 1997, 1999), Wade (1 988), and Baland and Platteau (1 996) all find similar 
basic characteristics that must be present in a group for successful solution of a CAP. 
These characteristics pertain to four basic variables: characteristics of the resources; 
nature of groups that depend on the resources; particulars of institutional regimes 
through which resources are managed; and the nature of the relationship between a 
group and external forces and authorities such as markets, states, and technology. 
Ostrom (2000) examined a large body of literature concerning common-property 
resources. She developed a revised list of attributes that increase the likelihood that 
self-governing associations will fonn. In this list, she gives attributes of both the 
resource and the appropriators: 
Attributes of the resource: 
1 .) Feasible improvement: Resource conditions are not at a point of 
deterioration such that it is useless to organize or so underutilized that 
little advantage results from organizing. 
2.) Indicators: Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the resource 
system are frequently available at a relatively low cost. 
3.) Predictability: The flow of resource units is relatively predictable. 
4.) Spatial extent: The resource system is sufficiently small, given the 
transportation and communications technology in use, that appropriators 
can develop accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal 
microenvironments. 
Attributes of the appropriators: 
1 .) Salience: Appropriators are dependent on the resource system for a major 
portion of their livelihood. 
2.) Common understanding: Appropriators have a shared image of how the 
resource system operates, and how their actions affect each other and the 
resource system. 
3.) Low discount rate: Appropriators use a sufficiently low discount rate in 
relation to future benefits to be achieved from the resource system. 
4.) Trust and reciprocity: Appropriators trust one another to keep promises 
and relate to one another with reciprocity. 
5.) Autonomy: Appropriators are able to determine access and harvesting 
rules without external authorities countermanding them. 
6.) Prior organizational experience and local leadership: Appropriators have 
learned at least minimal skills of organization and leadership through 
participation in other local associations or learning about ways that 
neighboring groups have organized. 
In all of these authors' research, the findings suggest that small groups of 
local users are more likely to solve CAPS than are larger groups or the intervention of 
an outside authority 
Traditional Fisheries Management 
Fisheries management has traditionally recognized the inefficiency problems 
inherent in fisheries, and has attempted to resolve them by implementing top-down 
controls on fishing effort. Management has often been designed with Hardin's tragedy in 
mind, with fishennen viewed at as self-interested pillagers of fisheries. Rather than 
working with fishermen to design plans to overcome communal action problems, 
managers have attempted, almost always unsuccessfully, to impose their own solutions. 
One solution is to raise the cost of fishing to account for extenlal costs. This can 
be accomplished with Pigouvian taxes. The taxes can be imposed on the right to fish, or 
on any number of different measures of fishing effort. This is politically unpopular, as 
fishermen are already seen to be suffering from the collapse of many fisheries. It is also 
complicated. If you tax inputs (horsepower, length of net, etc.). you encourage fishermen 
to change their input mix. Each type of input would have to be taxed in order to affect all 
fishermen fairly. There are also non-technological ways to change fishing effort, from 
changing fishing technology, to fishing at different times or different areas, and these 
differences would have to be addressed as well. Not only would such a tax system be 
complicated, it would also encourage black market trading in taxed technology. 
Taxing outputs (pounds of fish) seems simpler, but it also has drawbacks. It 
encourages underreporting or not reporting catch at all. 
Managers can simply decide what technology should be used and create laws 
demanding it. They can outlaw certain technologies, and demand certain mesh sizes. 
Unfortunately, limiting certain types of technologies encourages increases in unregulated, 
often inefficient technologies. In addition, these rules often carry with them huge 
enforcement costs. 
Another basic solution is to determine how much fish should be caught, and 
implement a catch quota. Although this sounds reasonable, it is more complicated than it 
seems. First of all, fisheries biology is not an exact science, and it is difficult to forecast 
the exact MSY for any stock. Even if this figure could be precisely identified, other 
problems emerge. Having a fixed quota results in a race to catch as many fish as possible 
before the quota is reached. Boats may be forced to face unsafe conditions in order to 
catch fish while they can. Also, quotas flood the market, resulting in lower prices while 
the fish are landed, and higher prices while the fishery is closed. 
Another management tool is to restrict the number of people able to fish by 
enacting a limited entry system. Managers can detemline how much fish can be caught 
sustainably, how much each fishermen is able to catch, and an optimum number of 
licenses to fish. This system suffers from the same biological uncertainty as does the 
quota system. In addition, once the number of licenses is set, each licensed fishermen has 
an incentive to increase his effort to maximize his gain from the rents created by limiting 
the number of fishermen. It is also politically difficult to determine who will be allowed 
to fish. Selling the licenses may be efficient, but it is politically unpopular. Linking 
license availability to past fishing history raises the problem of new entrants - how will 
they enter the fishery? License limitations may be easier in new fisheries, but once a 
person has the right to fish, it is very difficult to take that right away from him. 
One way to avoid these problems is to combine limited entry with a quota on 
catch. This is the concept of the individual transferable quota, or ITQ. By being 
transferable, fishermen are able to sell the quotas rights among themselves, ensuring they 
are held by those fishermen able to catch the quota most efficiently. Fishernlen that hold 
the rights are then able to spread their effort out over the year, resulting in a more 
efficient catch distribution. Despite economic efficiency, many fishermen oppose such 
plans in fear that the quotas will wind up in the hands of a few large processors able to 
afford to buy up many quota rights. 
Any attempt to control fishing effort can be subverted. The fact that fishing often 
takes place in small vessels in a large ocean area makes enforcement costs an important 
concern. Fisheries management has suffered failures in recent years, and these failures 
have not gone unnoticed by fishermen. Fishermen often distrust managers, and have a 
valid suspicion of the validity of their estimates and "scientific certainties." However, 
without the support of the fishermen, almost any management plan is doomed to fail. If 
the fishernlen don't stand behind the rules imposed upon them, the rules are often 
basically worthless. 
Spawned in part by collective action theory, a new trend is emerging in fisheries 
management. Rather than continuing with top-down management imposed upon 
fishernlen, managers are beginning to involve fishermen in the process. This co- 
management approach is apt to be more successful for many of the reasons discussed in 
the section on collective action problems. Small groups of users familiar with local 
conditions are able to design policies that fit the resource and the resource users best. 
When fishermen are involved with management, they are more likely to abide by the 
decisions imposed by it, which lowers enforcement costs. 
One problem with co-management is that it lacks a precise definition. Any 
situation in which two groups cooperate on resource management could be defined as 
"CO-management". However, a number of authors have examined various fonns of co- 
management and discussed their findings. 
Acheson (1 997, 1998) and Acheson et al( 2000) studied the effects of co- 
management in the Maine lobster fishery. The Maine coast is broken into management 
zones, in which local users play a large role in management. Each zone is governed by a 
zone council that creates and implements policy specifically suited to their zone. All of 
this is conducted under the guidance and supervision of the state. Prior to the creation of 
the zones and zone councils, the state had tried unsuccessfully for almost forty years to 
enact a trap limit law. Seven zones and their boundaries were established in 1997. By 
1998, each of these zones had established their own trap limits. Clearly, this is an 
example of successful co-management. 
Pinkerton and Weinstein (1 995) and Singleton (1 998) have also studied examples 
of co-management, primarily in the Pacific Northwest. They conducted numerous cases 
studies in which local user groups attempted to develop institutions to manage fisheries 
resources. They describe many of these attempts as successful, and suggest that co- 
management offers an efficient alternative to the traditional top-down management 
approach. 
Townsend (2002) examined fourteen cases in which fisheries participants 
negotiated bargains to deal with exploitation inefficiencies. Once the government 
established use rights, resource users were able to devise efficient allocation 
arrangements amongst themselves. In many cases, bargains were struck quickly in 
situations where the government had been unable to devise solutions for years. 
Townsend does not consider these cases to be examples of co-management. He considers 




DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Methods 
The state collects catch and effort data from all shellfish dealers within Maine. 
Dealers complete monthly forms in which they enter the number of bushels or pounds 
landed each day and the number of diggers who harvested them. They must also enter 
the town in which the clams were landed. For this study, I collected data for the entire 
state. I then separated all landings originating in Cushing, St. George, Thomaston, and 
South Thomaston. 
The data used for this analysis came from three sources: 
Data for the years 1978, 1979, 1 980, and 1 98 1 were obtained from Ralph 
Townsend at the University of Maine. He collected the data while they were still 
available from the state to use in a study on the impacts of management programs 
on harvest efficiency (Townsend, 1985). The data are no longer available from the 
state. 
Computerized, standardized landings data were obtained from the state for the 
years 1998,1999,2000, and 2001. 
Reliable landings data for Maine soft shell clam harvests are difficult to obtain prior 
to 1998. State records are incomplete and often inaccurate. Dealers are not always 
vigilant in their data entry. State data collection, computation, and entry methods have 
varied over the past 30 years. Landings data were collected in bushels in the 1970s and 
1980's and in pounds in the 1990's. The pound to bushel conversion factor has varied 
from 50 pounds per bushel to 65 pounds per bushel. The documentation concerning 
when these conversion factors changed is not reliable. It is therefore difficult to know if 
a "bushel" documented in 1978 is equal to 50,55,60, or 65 pounds. These 
inconsistencies complicate efforts to draw meaningful conclusions between pre and post- 
management figures. 
The character of the Georges River fishery has changed over the last 3 decades. 
Anecdotal evidence from area harvesters suggests that the early eighties represented the 
fishery most similar to today's in terms of the number of harvesters and the acreage of 
open flats. For this reason, and for reasons of data availability, data were collected for 
1978 to 1981. 
Conversion problems make comparisons between 1978- 198 1 data and 1998-2001 
data difficult. However, it is feasible to compare information within these year groups. 
For instance, 1978-1 98 1 catch per unit of effort data for the Georges River area can be 
compared with state data as a whole during that time. The same can be done for 1998- 
2001. 
1978- 198 1 Data 
Data for 1978- 1981 were compiled from state dealer sheets. Dealers listed daily 
totals of bushels purchased and the number of diggers who harvested them. According to 
Townsend (personal communication), a variety of ambiguous entries occurred in the raw 
data. In any given year, one-third to one-half of the landings data could not be associated 
with reliable effort data. Landings information for which reliable effort figures were not 
available was listed separately. The current study used only data associated with reliable 
effort data. 
In Townsend (1985), data were deleted from the file for three reasons: 1 .) All 
clams dug under depuration permits were excluded. As listed in chapter 4, depuration 
digging has higher average yields than traditional digging. Including depuration figures 
in totals would distort the catch per unit of effort data. 2) The data for three large dealers 
contained seriously misleading information and was removed. These dealers submitted 
information that was implausible compared to other dealer reports. 3.) The data for 
September 1980 were excluded. In September 1980, the DMR embargoed all digging of 
clams in Maine due to a high risk of paralytic shellfish poisoning. Dealers were 
permitted to buy clams on September 1 because some diggers possessed clams dug 
legally the day before. For many reasons, reported landings were extremely high for that 
day. In addition to data deleted from the original study, data from the March 1978 
Georges River area were deleted. Only 6 bushels were reported in this month (for 
unknown reasons), and the resulting CPUE figure was deemed an outlier and omitted 
from the final comparison. 
Each daily entry can be converted to a CPUE figure by dividing the number of 
bushels by the number of harvesters. This gives an average estimate yield for one digger 
for one day (yield per digger day). In order to standardize the results with later data, all 
bushel figures were converted to pounds using a 50: 1 conversion factor. ' To make the 
I This conversion figure was used because o f  its simplicity and the fact that it is most commonly used 
today. However, as stated earlier, because the conversion factor used by the dealers and the State from 
1978-1 98 1 is not known, it is nor possible to compare landings from 1978-198 1 to those o f  1998-2001. 
Instead, landings were compared within these two time periods. 
comparison between Georges River landings and state landings more meaningful, 
Georges River data were removed fiom state totals. 
1998-200 1 Data 
Data for 1998 to 2001 were obtained fiom Ron Aho, DMR area biologist for Mid- 
Coast Maine. He compiled the data fiom state dealer reports. From 1998 to the present, 
dealers list each purchase separately. Each purchase is assumed to represent the amount 
harvested by one digger on one day (yield per digger-day). Depuration landings are not 
identified separately. In an effort to exclude depuration landings, all harvests greater than 
300 pounds were discarded for this study (it is unlikely that any one harvester would be 
able to dig more than 300 pounds in one day unless working on a depuration crew). 
Data were compiled into monthly totals for landings and digger days. As in the previous 
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Figure 6 
Line Graph - CPUE, State vs. Georges River 
Time I vs. Time 2 
(error bars indicate standard errors of the mean) 









Bar Graph - CPUE, State vs. Georges River 
Time 1 vs. Time 2 
(error bars indicate standard errors of the mean) 
Results 
Georges River CPUE increased dramatically versus state CPUE in the years after 
management for which we have data. A Zway, factorial ANOVA (model 1) was 
conducted to determine if this difference is significant. The ANOVA was based on 
annual CPUE for each region over Time 1 (1 978- 1 98 1) and Time 2 (1 998-200 1). 
This analysis shows the Georges River CPUE to be significantly higher than the 
state average afier management was enacted. The state average CPUE was 93.8 pounds 
per digger-day for Time 1 (standard deviation of 2.7), and 76.3 pounds per digger for 
Time 2 (standard deviation of 2.8). The Georges River area CPUE was 100.9 pounds per 
digger-day for Time 1 (standard deviation 7.6), and 101.3 pounds per digger day for 
Time 2 (standard deviation 5.6). The probability (p-value) that the observed change in 
the relationship between Georges River area CPUE and the state CPUE would arise 
strictly due to chance is 0.0043. 
Table 2 
CPUE - State vs. Georges River 
Table 3 
ANOVA Table - CPUE - State vs. Georges River, Time 1 vs. Time 2 
State Average 
Georges River 
I source DF SS MS F I probability I 
Time 1 
































DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A number of different factors led to the development of the Georges River 
program. Certain issues provided incentives to formulate a town ordinance. Others 
provided incentives for a multi-town plan. In this chapter, I will discuss these factors 
individually. and then develop a broader discussion about the program's development, 
how it ties in with current theory, and its broader implications to resource management. 
Maine State Law 
In 1963, the Maine Legislature passed a law allowing all towns to enact shellfish 
ordinances granting preferential harvesting rights to residents. In January of 1996, 
Georges River area residents petitioned the legislature to enact a law granting the same 
privileges to multiple-town programs (L.D. 1 7 17). This law was approved on May 12, 
1996. 
With L.D. 171 7 in place, Georges River area residents were able to exclude others 
from the resource, a right co-management theorists and economists alike espouse as vital 
to effective conservation. The ability to exclude others provided a great incentive to 
enact local management. If the Georges River's flats had been opened without a local 
ordinance in place, diggers from all over the state would have been able to harvest the 
clam resource. It should be noted that Maine state law requires that at least 10% of all 
licenses be made available to non residents. However, 90% can be reserved exclusively 
for locals. By enacting a local ordinance, residents could limit "outsiders"' share of the 
resource to roughly 10%. 
The state of Maine allows towns to manage their own shellfish resources, and 
provides them with an incentive to do so -the ability to exclude others. It also provides 
biological knowledge and assistance to towns through area biologists. These factors 
facilitate the development of and support local management. 
Distribution Fights 
Knight argues that social norms and institutions are developed as a result of 
distribution fights. Almost all rules benefit some more than others. People struggle to 
establish rules that will increase their share of assets. Over time, these rules are often 
established as norms within the community. 
The establishment of a town ordinance in the Georges River area fits nicely with 
Knight's theory. Local residents were able to increase their individual benefits by 
implementing a town management plan. Had they done nothing, it is likely that diggers 
from all over the state would have quickly exhausted the resource. Without a 
management plan in place, there would be no incentive for any diggers (resident or non- 
resident) to constrain their effort. The benefits of constraint would be just as likely to fall 
to someone else as to the person who conserved. Generating a local ordinance allowed 
residents to increase their share of the resource by excluding others. 
Residents could also have opted to work with Spinney Creek to manage the 
resource. Day-to-day management decisions would have been left to Spinney Creek 
(Tom Howell's February 1996 letter to the town of St. George), and the towns could have 
simply collected a per-bushel fee. However, this would have decreased the amount of 
benefits falling to town residents. This proposal was rejected. 
A well-drafted local ordinance provides two benefits. First, it provides 
preferential benefits to area residents. Second, it reduces incentives to overexploit and 
increases incentives to conserve. The majority of municipal ordinances have one real 
purpose: to provide preferential harvesting for locals (Winters, personal communication). 
Local residents want to gain a greater share of the resource than outsiders. The only way 
they can exclude outsiders is by creating a local ordinance. Therefore, the primary 
purpose of these ordinances is not to preserve the resource, but to ensure a greater portion 
of the harvests goes to locals. Preferential harvesting rights create the incentive to 
conserve. Locals can be confident that the benefits of conservation will fall to them. 
Improvement to the health or size of the resource is therefore a secondary benefit. 
Conservation rules constrain individual behavior in order to provide a group 
benefit. Schlager and Ostrom (1 992) point out that individuals are more likely to exercise 
rights of management when the likelihood they will receive the benefits of management 
is high. In Maine, 90% of a town's commercial licenses can be reserved for local 
residents. Town programs can develop rules to constrain everyone's behavior, but 
provide 90% of the benefits to locals. This provides a clear incentive to implement town 
management. The likelihood of effective management increases along with the security 
of benefits. 
Political Entrepreneur 
Olson (1 965) pointed out that groups may not be able to devise rules despite the 
apparent benefits they would generate. Organizing imposes costs, and the benefits of 
organizing are not always certain or substantial enough to overcome these costs. A 
catalyst of some sort may be needed to initiate and encourage an organization effort. 
Olson (1 965) and Hardin (1982) both identified the political entrepreneur as an important 
potential catalyst to collective action. 
Latent groups do not organize because the individual benefits of action do not 
overcome the potential costs. Group members cannot be sure their efforts will succeed; 
any costs they incur may be in vain. Even if they are successful, benefits will flow to the 
entire group, including those who did not cooperate. Under these conditions, it is rational 
for an individual to do nothing but sit back and wait for benefits to be provided. By 
doing so he incurs no costs, but receives just as many benefits as anyone else. Everyone 
thinks the same way, and a collective effort does not take place. 
Political entrepreneurs can help to overcome the obstacles to collective action. As 
defined by Hardin (1 982), "Political entrepreneurs are people who, for their own career 
reasons, find it in their private interest to work to provide collective benefits to relevant 
groups." Sherman Hoyt fits this description. In 1995, he was looking for a new career. 
He felt that organizing stakeholders and creating a management program might provide it 
(personal communication with Sherman Hoyt). He began work as an unpaid volunteer. 
By the second year of program development, he was able to collect a salary from grants. 
Recognition of his hard work and effective leadership led to a job with Cooperative 
Extension in 1999. 
Hoyt was also interested in developing a sustainable fishery for altruistic reasons: 
he is a resident of the area, and has ties to the community. By organizing the Clam 
Restoration Project, he benefited both the community and himself. 
Many people involved with the program say it would never have come about 
without the efforts of Sherman Hoyt (personal communications with Shellfish Committee 
and Joint Board members). As mentioned in the background section, locals were 
generally in favor of a multi-town program, but it was Hoyt that inspired them to act. 
There are many other individuals who volunteered their time and energy to help build the 
program. However, Hoyt was the key player who spearheaded organizational efforts and 
was instrumental in program development. 
Geography and History of the Area 
The layout of the area is conducive to a multi-town plan. The five towns are 
aligned along the river. Although St. George has some flats on its ocean side, the most 
productive flats are contained within the estuary. Historically, diggers worked the entire 
area irrespective of town boundaries, so it seemed natural to develop an estuary-wide 
ordinance. 
By 1994, many towns along the coast of Maine had developed municipal shellfish 
ordinances. Because the Georges River was closed, none of the towns had developed 
municipal programs. The fact that none of the towns had ordinances in place made it 
easier to develop a multi-town plan. It is easier to build a program from the ground up 
than to try to patch together individual programs. If any one of the towns had had a 
program in place, they might have resented the other towns benefiting from the work they 
had already undertaken. The fact that all the towns were closed, and all had something to 
offer the program, meant that they could start on equal ground. 
The Georges River Tidewater Association established a precedent for multi-town 
cooperation along the river. Stakeholders fiom all of the towns worked together to 
improve water quality. It was because of these efforts that the flats were opened. The 
Tidewater Association served as proof that local-level stakeholders could make great 
accomplishments in the area. The Tidewater Association was the first to suggest that a 
multi-town ordinance be developed. They have maintained a good relationship with the 
SMC, and have assisted with shellfish activities such as water quality testing and 
shoreline clean-ups. 
The long-term closure of the river allowed the clams within the flats to grow in 
both numbers and individual size, unabated by human predation. Local harvesters 
working for depuration companies witnessed large numbers of mature clams within the 
flats. Unlike other fisheries, where the size and numbers within a stock must be predicted, 
residents were actually able to see the clams that had been growing throughout the 
closure period. They could see the clams that would be theirs once a program were 
established. This potential gold mine was an incentive to act. 
Depurators 
Local harvesters believed they were being treated unfairly by Spimey Creek, the 
depuration company doing business in the area at the time the restoration project began. 
They perceived Spinney Creek as an outsider who was benefiting disproportionately from 
"their clams" (personal communication with Shellfish Committee and Joint Board 
members). This perception of unfairness was supported by Spimey Creek's 1996 letter 
to the town of St. George in which they offered to pay a per-bushel surcharge of $5, ten 
times the rate they had been paying at the time. 
Animosity toward Spinney Creek fostered an "us against them" mentality. When 
Roger Gagne suggested the five towns enter into an exclusive arrangement with Spinney 
Creek, the idea was soundly rejected. Locals wanted to manage the resource for 
themselves. Spinney Creek's offer created an additional incentive for local cooperation. 
Many of the harvesters felt they needed to work together to "take back" the resource from 
outsiders (personal communication with Shellfish Committee members). By enacting a 
local ordinance, two groups of outsiders (depuration companies and non-residents) would 
have their share of the resource reduced. 
Attributes of the resource and of harvesters 
The sedentary nature of (mature) clams removes one of the difficulties present in 
the management of mobile fisheries. A soft-shell clam will not travel between 
management zones within its adult life cycle. Ostrom (2000) states that knowledge 
(predictability) of the resource, known spatial extent, visible indicators of resource health, 
and feasible improvement facilitate self-governance. Each of these factors positively 
influenced by the sedentary nature of clams (see next page, "Attributes of the resource"). 
Taylor and Singleton (1 993) believe that a sense of community in a group 
increases the likelihood of successful collective action. Organizing to overcome a CAP 
creates transactions costs in the form of search costs, bargaining costs, and monitoring 
and enforcement costs. Con~munity economizes on the need for transaction resources to 
overcome these costs. 
A number of characteristics influence the sense of community in a group. Taylor 
and Singleton (1 993) identify stability of relations, multiplex relations, direct relations, 
and shared beliefs and preferences as important factors influencing a group's sense of 
community. Cultural heterogeneity can undermine efforts to cooperate. 
Residents of the Georges River area have a strong sense of community. Many of 
the stakeholders involved in the development of the program had lived in the area for 
years. Their children attended local schools together, and they worked together on the 
flats and in local community groups. Mid-coast Maine does not exhibit cultural 
heterogeneity to any large extent. There are "summer residents" and year-round residents 
that make up different classes. The management program provided incentives for all 
residents to work together, regardless of their social standing. The plan would not only 
provide jobs for commercial harvesters - it would provide all residents the opportunity to 
dig a "mess" of clams. However, the majority of the people that worked to pass the 
shellfish management plan were year-round residents of the same or similar social class. 
These factors made it easier for the group to identify possible solutions and to bargain. 
Ostrom (1990,2000) developed two lists of factors that facilitate the development 
of a self-governing resource system and successful solution to CAP'S. These lists are 
discussed in the literature review. Her (2000) list describes attributes of the resource and 
of the appropriators that increase the likelihood a self-governing association will form. 
The Georges River Program possesses many of these attributes: 
Attributes of the resource: 
1 .) Feasible improvement: Harvesters could see that a large number of good-sized 
clams had developed during the time the river was closed. This provided a "goal" 
of being able to harvest these clams, and provided evidence that clam stocks could 
improve under certain conditions (if years of rest could improve resource health 
compared to open-access harvesting, perhaps management could also improve the 
resource). 
2.) Indicators: Harvesters were able to see the health of the stock both by digging for 
depuration crews and by observing the siphon holes on the flats. 
3.) Predictability: Clam stocks are fairly sedentary, and although a stock-recruitment 
relationship is not known, it is generally believed that a large parent population 
will lead to large future populations. 
4.) Spatial extent: Many harvesters had worked the estuary for years, and were 
familiar with the both the resource and the estuary in which it occurred. 
Attributes of the appropriators: 
Salience: Harvesters believed they would be able to earn a decent income from 
the resource. 
Common understanding: Most of the people interested in harvesting the resource 
had dug clams before both on the Georges and elsewhere, and were familiar with 
how their actions would impact other harvesters and the resource itself. 
Low discount rate: Once their rights to the resource were secure, harvesters 
displayed an interest in developing a sustainable fishery rather than quickly 
depleting the resource. 
Trust and reciprocity: Harvesters and stakeholders were all local residents and 
most were familiar with each other. They were more likely to trust neighbors 
from the area than those "from away". 
Autonomy: The SMC and Joint Board are able to develop their own rules. 
Although the program must be approved by the state DMR, they can act largely 
autonomously. 
Prior organizational experience and local leadership: The Tidewater Association 
provided an example of what local stakeholder groups could accomplish. 
Sherman Hoyt was an experienced leader. The Joint Board was composed of 
local selectmen familiar with municipal management processes. 
Ostrom (1990) also describes "8 design principles" that tend to be present in long- 
enduring common-pool resource institutions. The Georges River Program also has many 
of these attributes: 
1 .) Clearly defined boundaries: Clam flats within the estuary were entirely contained 
within the five towns, so boundaries were well-defined. 
2.) Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: 
Rules were devised by the harvesters and local stakeholders. The governance 
structure, the numbers of licenses assigned, the times when digging was allowed, 
the schedule and type of conservation and management activities, and the 
penalties for rule infractions were all devised by the people who best knew the 
resource. 
Collective-choice arrangements: Harvesters serve on the SMC. The ordinance is 
reviewed and approved on an annual basis by both the Joint Board and the 
Shellfish Management Committee. However, harvesters do not serve on the Joint 
Board, which has ultimate decision-making authority. 
Monitoring: Although harvesters do not have enforcement abilities, they do 
monitor each other, and report transgressions to the warden and to each other. 
Graduated sanctions: The ordinance outlines penalties that increase with the 
severity and frequency of the crime. 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms: This ordinance does not outline exact conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Although mechanisms are in place to resolve conflict 
between the towns, no specified mechanism is in place to resolve conflict between 
diggers or between the SMC and the Joint Board 
Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The state of Maine recognized the 
towns' right to develop and maintain regional management. 
Laws within the state of Maine provided incentives to establish local-level 
management. Preferential harvesting rights increased harvesters' incentive to conserve. 
These facts, combined with attributes of the resource and harvesters, facilitated self- 
governance in the Georges River area. 
Knight suggests rules emerge as people fight to increase their share of assets. 
Schlager and Ostrom suggest that the likelihood of successful management increases as 
harvesters gain more rights to a resource. The presence and security of rights to a 
resource are therefore important factors in the development and maintenance of 
management. The fact that clams are sedentary once settled increases the security of 
harvesters' rights. The relative strength of locals' rights to the Georges River clam 
resource increased the likelihood of effective management. 
The concept of co-management is gaining popularity in fisheries management 
circles. Local-level groups are slowly increasing their participation in management 
decisions over fishery resources. Advocates of co-management have gathered a good 
deal of evidence to assert that local-level decision making is a key determinant to 
management success (Feeney et. al, 1996, Ostrom, 1990, Singleton, 1998). However, 
local level control alone does not explain how and why the Georges River Program 
began, and how it developed into an effective management plan. 
Management Alternatives: Co-management vs. Property Rights 
The resource economic literature states that ownership rights to resources and 
product are important deternlinants of economic efficiency (Agnello and Donnely, 1975). 
Since Anthony Scott (1 955) proposed sole ownership of fisheries resources, economists 
have been in agreement that privatization of fishery resources would solve their 
inefficiency problems. However, freedom of access to ocean and coastal resources is 
deeply ingrained in western culture. Creating formalized ownership rights over fishery 
resources is often not feasible. 
Common property theorists argue that the solution to current fisheries 
management crises is to allow resource users to develop management institutions tailored 
to fit local conditions (Feeney et al., 1996). Common property theorists give examples of 
successful local governance institutions and argue that resource users are best equipped to 
manage resources. They assert that traditional management has been unable to devise 
successful solutions to collective action problems. Numerous examples of failed 
centralized management exist to back their claims (Wunsch, 199 1, Ostrom, 1990). 
Traditional practice has implemented one solution to fisheries inefficiencies: centralized 
governance. However, traditional theory has identified two solutions: centralized 
management or privatization of the resource. Common property theorists have dismissed 
the latter as summarily as the former, but without equivalent evidence. 
Lack of secure property rights complicates any attempt to reduce fisheries 
externalities. Although property rights would reduce inefficiency, co-management 
theorists favor other alternatives. Taylor and Singleton (1 993) claim a sense of 
community helps groups to bargain away externalities and overcome collective action 
dilemmas. The greater a sense of community a group possesses, the greater their 
likelihood of successful resource governance development and solution of communal 
action dilemmas. 
Schlager and Ostrom (1993) identify four basic types of property rights and 
resource users in fisheries resources. They determine that the more rights a resource user 
has, the more likely they are to use the resource efficiently. 
The authors point out that economists draw an important distinction between 
owners, who hold a complete set of rights, and all other users, who do not hold complete 
rights. Quoting Posner (1975)' they state that the rights of alienation combined with 
rights of exclusion produce incentives for long-term investment in a resource. This 
argument is at the foundation of economic efficiency theory in resource management. 
Despite Posner's argument, Schlager and Ostrom stress the importance of rights 
of exclusion rather than alienation. They state that the right of exclusion increases the 
likelihood that resource users will capture the benefits of coordinating their activities. 
However, they neglect to mention that alienation.furrher increases this likelihood by 
allowing resource users to capture returns on investment through sale or lease. 
Schlager and Ostrom examined 44 subgroups of fishers in their study to determine 
how varying levels of rights impacted the likelihood of effective self-governance. They 
classified each sub-group into one of four categories of users: authorized users, claimants, 
owners, or proprietors. However, they break their results into only three categories: 
authorized users, claimants, and owners and proprietors. Of the 44 subgroups examined, 
26 were proprietors, and only one was an owner. 
The authors state that owners and proprietors are more likely to develop 
successful self-governance than are claimants. They also state that claimants are more 
likely to do so than are authorized users. They discuss in detail the benefits conferred by 
each additional level of rights. Each level, that is, until alienation. They place the most 
emphasis on the right of exclusion, and then gloss over the additional benefits of 
alienation. Their argument is clear and thorough for the first three levels of rights 
holders. Each level is more likely than the one before it to develop successful self- 
governance. The obvious inference is that the likelihood of successful self-governance 
increases with increasing property rights. However, this conclusion is conspicuous by its 
absence. If the authors were to make this statement, they would be tacitly admitting that 
ownership creates the greatest incentives for successful resource management. 
Throughout this paper, they go to great lengths to avoid making this statement. 
The majority of soft-shell clam management in Maine takes place at the local 
level. Townsend (1985) found that harvesters working on managed flats experience 15% 
higher yields than those working on unmanaged flats. This finding backs up the claim 
that local-level management can be very effective. However, the story does not stop 
there. Townsend (1986) found that diggers working on depuration crews experience 60% 
higher yields than those working on unmanaged flats. When depurators are few, or when 
depuration companies are given exclusive access to particular resources, the management 
approximates private ownership (Townsend, 1986). This finding suggests that there are 
benefits to be had beyond those conferred by the right of exclusion. 
Implications and Conclusion 
The Georges River area clearly had a number of attributes that facilitated the 
development of a self-governing institution. Once the Clam Fishery Restoration Project 
began to meet, they made a number of choices that led to the development of a successful 
program. Ostrom (2000) says the development of a self-governing association is affected 
by the type of larger regime in which the association is imbedded. The state of Maine 
provides municipalities with an environment conducive to self-governance. It provides 
towns with valuable biological knowledge and assistance through area biologists. It also 
gives municipalities a large degree of autonomy in designing their programs. The ability 
to exclude (all but 10%) of outsiders is a strong incentive to implement management. 
Knight argues that rules emerge as a result of distribution fights. This argument is 
supported by the fact that most municipal shellfish programs in Maine (including that of 
the St. George area) restrict non-resident licenses to no more than 10%. 
The ability to exclude others increases incentives for long-term investment in 
municipal shellfish programs. Stock enhancement is one type of long-term investment in 
a shellfish resource, and is a major component of many municipal programs. However 
enhancement projects are complicated by the lack of a reliable stock-recruitment 
relationship for soft-shell clams. Although adult clams are sedentary, immature clams are 
sometimes highly mobile. A town that engages in stock enhancement may therefore 
provide benefits to itself, to another town, or to no one. This uncertainty decreases the 
strength of town property rights over its soft-shell clam resource, and can act as a 
counter-incentive to long-tem1 investment. 
Ostrom's 1990 list describes attributes present in successful long-standing self- 
governance institutions. Although the Georges River program has a majority of these 
attributes, it has not been in existence long enough to qualify as "long-standing". It 
remains to be seen whether or not the attributes it possesses, combined with other factors, 
will result in a successful long-standing program. 
The Program has already survived several conflict challenges. The change in 
administrative municipality, along with conflict over power sharing, the warden's role, 
town funding, and the aiding and abetting incident all created conflict. Any of these 
incidents could have resulted in decreased confidence in and eventual dissolution of the 
program. Only time will tell if the SMC and Joint Board possess the ability to weather 
conflict over the long-term. 
Shem~an Hoyt was a huge influence in program development. However, the 
program has continued successfully thus far despite his decreased role. A few key 
players seem to be continual forces on the Shellfish Committee and Joint Board. Several 
of these players have complained of being tired of doing a large portion of the work. So 
far, a new participant has stepped up each time a key player steps down. Enthusiasm and 
participation have varied. However, harvesters seem to recognize the benefits of their 
conservation efforts, and continue to fulfill their conservation hours in order to be eligible 
for a license. Although enthusiasm for the program has waxed and waned, it has yet to 
completely disappear. People continue to serve on the Shellfish Committee and Joint 
Board, and do the work necessary to keep the program running. 
Townsend's (1 985) finding that management increases yields by 15% can be used 
to support the concept of town management. However, if increased yields were the 
primary aim of town programs, depuration would be a popular alternative to town 
management. The fact that it is not implies that town programs are concerned with 
something more than harvesting efficiency. 
Knight's theory of distribution fights offers a plausible explanation of this 
"something more". By enacting a local ordinance, municipalities increase their residents' 
share of shellfish resources. The state of Maine does allow private leasing of shellfish 
harvesting areas. However, private leasing has not become a popular alternative to town 
management (Hal Winters, personal communication). Developing a lease would create 
distribution fights within the town. Dividing up the resource into shares would be 
difficult. It would be difficult to determine a method for determining each individual's 
share. To develop a practical lease arrangement, some people would have to be 
excluded. The SMC displayed an unwillingness to exclude locals when they detennined 
that 128 licenses would be made available in 1996. This figure corresponded to the 
number of locals who desired a license at the time. By enacting a local ordinance, 
residents can significantly decrease "outsiders"' share of benefits without having to 
divide the resource up into exact shares within the town. 
Co-management theory suggests that local users are best suited to devise self- 
governance institutions to manage resources. This study concurs with Schlager and 
Ostrom's (1 992) finding that local governance institutions benefit from the addition of 
property rights, be they fonnal or informal. However, this study also suggests that 
stronger property rights could potentially increase the effectiveness of management. 
Increases or reductions in stock size may be due many factors other than 
management. The problems created by biological variability can be further complicated 
by inaccurate or incomplete landings data. It is therefore difficult to detennine the 
success of the Georges River program based on the health of the stocks. Before the 
success of the Georges River program can be detennined, "success" must be defined. If 
the purpose of the Georges River Program is to provide employment to local residents, it 
has thus far succeeded. It has managed to keep the majority of the resource available 
exclusively to locals. It has also maintained conservation-minded behavior among 
diggers, who fulfill 10 hours of conservation time each year to obtain their license. 
Success in clam management must be defined in order to be detennined. The 
endurance of the program, employment generated, or the health of the stock are all 
possible factors with which to define success. Each of these determinants is complicated 
by biological variability and other factors beyond the control of management. However, 
the Georges River Program has been a success in several definable ways: 1 .) It has 
managed to overcome a communal action dilemma to get rules passed. 2.) These rules 
appear to be working. The stock does not appear to be declining, and the program has 
generated employment within the area for over 5 years. 3.) It has assured that the 
majority of the resource is reserved for locals. 
The Georges River program benefited from a number of fortunate circumstances. 
Attributes of the harvesters, area geography, the resource itself, and Maine state law 
facilitated developn~ent of the program. The Georges River Estuary experiences greater 
CPUE than the state average. It is reasonable to suggest that this increased CPUE is due 
at least in part to management. The increased yields available in the area provide rents 
unavailable in other industries. As long as the Georges River continues to experience 
greater CPUE than other areas of the state, the demand for licenses should continue. 
Because conservation time must be completed to be eligible for a license, participation in 
the shellfish committee should continue as well. The program seems poised to 
experience "success" into the near future. 
Figure 8 
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